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ADHERENCE TO THE ORIGINAL INTENTIONS
IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION:
THREE OBJECTIONS AND
RESPONSES
Richard S. Kay*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 1968 television interview, Justice Black was asked about certain
unpopular constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court. "Well," he re-
plied, "the Court didn't do it .... The Constitution did it."'  His re-
sponse nicely captures the conventional view of constitutional
adjudication. According to this view, when a court finds unconstitu-
tional the otherwise lawful action of some agency of government, it
merely acts as the executor of a conclusive determination already embed-
ded in the Constitution.2 This understanding is the standard fare of
school civics books. 3 It is the implicit assumption underlying the boast
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I would like to acknowledge the
institutional support provided by the University of Connecticut School of Law which has greatly
assisted me in carrying out this work. I am grateful to Deborah Calloway, William Marshall, Henry
Monaghan, Thomas Morawetz, John Noyes, Dennis Patterson, Michael Perry, H. Jefferson Powell,
Aviam Soifer, John Valauri, and Carol Weisbrod, who made useful, critical, and encouraging com-
ments on prior drafts. I was fortunate to have the intelligent and careful research assistance of Paul
DeGenaro and Alice Carey.
I Justice Black and The Bill of Rights (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 3, 1968). At another
point in his answer to the same question, Justice Black said, "the Constitution-makers did it." Id.
(emphasis supplied). This formulation is closer to the nature of original intentions adjudication
discussed in this essay than is the quotation in text. See infra text accompanying notes 16-49.
2 This is the rationale upon which the power of judicial review was originally asserted. Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
3 See, e.g., Celebrating our Constitution, Hartford Courant, Sept. 16, 1987. In this special sec-
tion aimed at school children, the writers say that the Supreme Court has "the difficult job of decid-
ing just what the Framers meant when they wrote the Constitution. The court's work is to say
whether laws agree with the Constitution." Id. at 13. This outlook is so elementary that school
books rarely do more than note that the Court has the power to invalidate a law or action that
"violates some part of the Constitution." A. DAVID, FAMOUS SUPREME COURT CASES 6 (1979)
(9th grade text). See also H. PETERSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICA'S STORY 19 (1975)
("The Court strikes down a law when the justices rule it violates or is against the Constitution.")
(elementary school text). The official Immigration and Naturalization Service text on government
for prospective citizens says that the Supreme Court's function includes the duty "to decide whether
laws passed by Congress agree with the Constitution." U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, I.N.S., OUR GOVERN-
MENT 82 (1973).
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that our government is one of laws and not men.4 And it is regularly
expressed by the Supreme Court when exercising the power of judicial
review.
The reality, as every law student learns, is quite different. Almost
from the beginning of our constitutional history, courts have invalidated
government actions in the name of the Constitution, while relying on
standards of decision that could not be inferred from the written Consti-
tution itself. Most observers agree that a substantial portion of constitu-
tional law is only tenuously connected to the Constitution of 1787-89, as
amended.6
4 The same idea underlies the use of the corollary slogan--"No man is above the law"--a
maxim of our government frequently cited during the Watergate affair of the early 1970s. See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974). See generally J. DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW:
THE BATTLES OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS COX AND JAWORSKI-A BEHIND THE SCENES Ac-
COUNT (1977).
5 See, eg., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958) in which the Supreme Court premised the
legal supremacy of its constitutional judgments on its supremacy "in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution." The Court also equated defiance of its orders with "warring] against the Constitu-
tion." Id.
Commentators dispute the extent to which the public and Court actually embrace the conven-
tional model of original intentions adjudication. Some writers, favorable and unfavorable to this
position, admit its prevalence. See, e.g., Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" Constitution, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 633, 635 (1983); Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justification for JudicialActiv-
ism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 465, 516-20 (1983); Levinson, The Turn Toward Functionalism in Con-
stitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 567, 572 (1983). Other writers assert exactly the opposite,
though often without specific supporting authority. Michael Perry cites to the popular press and
concludes "[clertainly the crucial segments [of the population] are well aware [of the actual nature of
Supreme Court adjudication]". M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 141 (1982). More typical are assertions of general awareness of the nature of constitutional
adjudication without specific evidence. See, eg., Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Consti-
tution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justfied?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1487 (1985).
Modern polling data suggest the continuing predominance of the conventional view of constitu-
tional adjudication, although they also show a significant minority belief to the contrary. A Septem-
ber 1987 Gallup Poll asked respondents whether they thought that, in interpreting the Constitution,
Supreme Court justices should "apply the intentions of the original authors of the Constitution" or
"their own values as well." Fifty-two percent chose just the original intentions. Forty percent
thought it proper for judges to consult their own values. A Newsweek Poll: Bork, the Court and the
Issues, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1987, at 26.
The Supreme Court has asserted consistently that its job is the application of rules made by the
creators of the Constitution. This continues to be evident by its professed reliance on historical
materials. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
946-51 (1983). While separate, and often dissenting, opinions occasionally acknowledge the non-
textual and non-historical nature of modern jurisprudence, see, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 526, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting), this is much rarer in the opinions of the Court. For an
uneasy exception, acknowledging prior recognition of rights "that have little or no textual support in
the constitutional language," see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). See also Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). This practice of the Court is some evidence of a
popular understanding that assumes fidelity to the original intentions: "The way an institution ad-
vertises tells you what it thinks its customers demand." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1971).
6 See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 1-2;
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For a long time, constitutional lawyers failed to confront the dis-
crepancy between the actions of the courts and the conventional justifica-
tion for those actions.7 In the last decade, however, scholars have taken
an increasing interest in the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication.
This development may be attributed, in part, to the work of Raoul Ber-
ger, whose exposition of the fourteenth amendment's legislative history
argued the incompatibility of much modem constitutional adjudication
with the intentions of the creators of the constitutional text." While some
of Berger's critics attempted to refute the accuracy of his historical re-
search,9 most contested its relevance. These critics questioned the con-
ventional premise underlying Berger's book-that the proper task of
judges in judicial review is limited to the application of rules expressed or
implied in the written document.' 0 Indeed, while scholars do not gener-
ally agree about the correct methodology for judicial review, there does
seem to be widespread support for a process largely unrestrained by the
intentions of the people who actually created the Constitution.11
We have thus arrived at a point where the academic consensus di-
rectly conflicts with the conventional understanding of judicial authority.
Most proponents of contemporary constitutional scholarship would
not-indeed, would scorn to-justify a constitutional judgment as Justice
Black did: "The Constitution did it."
This essay will critically examine the reasons given by modem
scholars for rejecting the conventional norm of judicial review-adher-
ence to the original intentions of the Constitution's enactors. While vari-
ously phrased, their reasons may be subsumed under three general
objections: 1) Adherence to the original intentions is impossible; 2) It is
self-contradictory; and 3) It is wrong.
While there is some force in each of these objections, I conclude that
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 223-24 (1980);
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 710-14 (1975).
7 This is not to say the discrepancy was entirely unnoticed. See, eg., C. TIEDEMANN, THE
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1890).
8 See generally R. BERGER, supra note 6.
9 Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237 (1982);
Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979).
10 See, eg., the symposium on Berger's book at 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403 (1979).
11 See, e.g., Symposium, ConstitutionalAdjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. RE.
259 (1981); Symposium, Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Symposium,
Judicial Review and the Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983).
But see R. BERGER, supra note 6; Bork, supra note 5; Grano, Judicial Review and a Written
Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981); Maltz, Forward: The Appeal of
Originalism, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Maltz, Appeal]; Maltz, The Failure ofAttacks
on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMM. 43 (1987) [hereinafter Maltz, Constitutional
Originalism ]; Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of the Intent of the Framers
in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L. REV. 811 (1983) [hereinafter Maltz, New Thoughts]; Monaghan,
The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 117 (1978); Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981) [hereinafter Monaghan, Perfect].
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the first two are unconvincing and the third depends on personal judg-
ments ultimately not susceptible to rational resolution. My objective is
to provide responses to these objections and not to make a complete af-
firmative case for original intentions adjudication.12 In the end, as dis-
cussed in section V outlining my response to the third objection, 13 I can
no more hope to convince people whose preferences are based on values
and attitudes which I do not share than they can expect to persuade me.
I also do not intend to argue that, historically, adjudicated constitu-
tional law is in any significant way an actual reflection of the original
intentions. Clearly it is not. Rather my goal is to clarify the arguments
for one or another approach to constitutional adjudication as an abstract
matter. Moreover, the practical consequences of accepting the propriety
of original intentions adjudication may be extremely limited. The legal,
social and economic impacts of judicial review cannot be wished away,
nor may we want them to be. An abrupt and complete adoption of origi-
nal intentions adjudication might inflict injuries that far transcend the
kinds of specifically legal considerations I discuss here.14 I am con-
vinced, however, that we cannot intelligently discuss these practical mat-
ters until we have a clear sense of the underlying theoretical positions
and disagreements.
II. THE NATURE OF ORIGINAL INTENTIONS ADJUDICATION
Before discussing the objections to original intentions adjudica-
tion, 15 it is important to resolve a persistent ambiguity. Adherence to the
conventional view of constitutional adjudication is sometimes associated
with the idea that judges should be tethered to the intentions of those
12 Perhaps the firmness with which the conventional view is entrenched in our judicial history
and the apparent breadth of its hold in the popular mind place the burden of persuasion on those
who question it. See Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation'. The Activist Flight From The Consti-
tution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1986); Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 383, 385
(1985); Maltz, Constitutional Originalism, supra note 11, at 55. Cf Schlag, Framer's Intent: The
Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 283, 285-86 (1985) (explaining presumptive
attractions of original intentions adjudication).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 295-331.
14 See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 411-13; Brest, supra note 6, at 232; Simon, supra note 5, at
1527 (1985). For a discussion of the theoretical basis for constitutional stare decisis, see Monaghan,
Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979).
15 It has become difficult to cope with the proliferating labels for various schools of constitu-
tional adjudication, such as interpretivist, textualist, originalist, and intentionalist. Each may engen-
der an opposite by attaching the prefix, "non-". Each may be modified as strict or moderate.
Explanations for most of these terms are found in Brest, supra note 6. The term "interpretation" has
been used by people who would accord a less than controlling part to the original intentions. See,
e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 51-52 (1986) (distinguishing "conversational" and "creative"
interpretation); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
"Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. Rv. 551, 572 n.68 (1984) (objecting to a single "stipulated" mean-
ing of "interpretation.") For the conventional technique that is the subject of this essay, I have
chosen the term "original intentions adjudication."
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who enacted the relevant constitutional provisions, and sometimes with
the idea that judges should be restrained by the text itself, independent of
the particular historical intentions of those who created it. 16 The model I
discuss will require further elaboration, but, briefly put, it calls for judges
to apply the rules of the written constitution in the sense in which those
rules were understood by the people who enacted them. Probably the
purest judicial exposition and application of this understanding can be
found in Justice Sutherland's dissenting opinion in the Minnesota Mort-
gage Moratorium case. 17 He said the "aim of construction" is to "dis-
cover the meaning," that is to "ascertain and give effect to the intent of
its framers and the people who adopted it." s18 The view discussed here,
therefore, rejects the idea that judicial allegiance is owed only to the mere
words of the Constitution.19
The "text-by-itself" idea does not explain the way we actually think
about or treat texts of any kind, and it seems particularly unsuitable for a
court that deals with authoritative legal texts. Some scholars have per-
suasively argued that it is impossible to deal with a "piece of language"
independently of some real or presumed human intention connected with
it.20 Words are only meaningless marks on paper or random sounds in
the air until we posit an intelligence which selected and arranged them.21
16 The latter idea may be close to what Paul Brest calls "textualism." See Brest, supra note 6, at
205. For various expressions of this position, see C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES
OF HISTORY 153-55 (1969); Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445, 459-
60 (1984); Harris, Bonding Word and Polity: The Logic ofAmerican Constitutionalism, 76 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 34, 43-44 (1982); Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151, 186-87
(1981); Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 668 (1987); Schauer, An Essay on Consti-
tutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797, 809-12 (1982). Holmes put the point this way: "We do
not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Holmes, The Theory of
Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1898-99).
17 Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
18 Id. at 453.
19 That is, the language of the constitution must be taken in a semantic and not solely in a
syntactic sense. The "syntactic" properties of an expression refer strictly to its inspectable form.
The "semantic" properties, on the other hand, refer to the objects or states of affairs designated by
the expression. See Birmingham, Holmes on 'Peerless. Raffles v. Wichelhaus and the Objective The-
ory of Contract, 47 U. PrIr. L. REV. 183, 194 (1985).
20 See authorities cited infra note 21.
21 See P. JUHL, INTERPRETATION: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY CRITICISM
(1980); Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723, 727-29 (1982). These argu-
ments have largely been directed against the "New Criticism" strain of modem literary criticism
which asserts that the sole object of analysis ought to be the language of the relevant text. The locus
classicus is Wimsatt & Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in W. WIMSATr, THE VERBAL ICON:
STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY 3 (1954). On the new criticism, see T. EAGLETON, LITER-
ARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 47-53 (1983). Walter Benn Michaels has applied a contrary
position, emphasizing the indispensability of reference to the author, explicitly to questions of consti-
tutional interpretation. See Michaels, The Fate of the Constitution, 61 TEX. L. REv. 765, 774 (1982)
[hereinafter Michaels, Fate] ("[N]o one treats sounds or marks as words unless he or she thinks of
them as speech acts expressing the intentions of some agent."); Michaels, Response to Perry and
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It would then be a contradiction in terms to speak of "intentionless
meaning." 22 Of course, one may assign a meaning different from the one
intended by the original authors, but this merely substitutes some other
hypothetical author for the historical ones.
23
We do sometimes assign meaning to words by attaching to them the
intention that our experience tells us is most frequently associated with
them. 24 Usually this will yield the meaning intended by the author. But
the argument that permits such an assignment in all cases assumes the
propriety of sometimes applying a meaning other than that intended by
the text's true authors. To make this substitution in interpreting a legal
text raises an acute issue of authority because it replaces the actual
lawmaker with a hypothetical normal speaker of the language. Yet we
usually assume that the force that gives legal rules their authority is some
pre-existing right of the lawmaker.25 In legal interpretation, therefore,
we are not interested in some abstract meaning of words but in the mean-
ing of the utterance of those words on a particular occasion.
26
The critical role of the lawmaker's intention is clear when we ex-
Simon, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 673 (1985) [hereinafter Michaels, Response]. Among philosophers, H. P.
Grice has emphasized the essential character of reference to intentions in taking meaning from lan-
guage. See Grice, Utterer's Meaning and Intentions, 78 PHIL. REv. 47 (1969).
22 See authorities cited supra note 21.
23 See E. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 3 (1967); Michaels, Response, supra note 21,
at 678-79.
24 See Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A Peek Into the Mind and Will of a Legislature, 50
IND. L.J. 206, 208 (1975) (referring to the "manifest" as opposed to "subjective" intention); Knapp
& Michaels, A Reply to Richard Rorty: What Is Pragmatism?, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 466, 468-69
(1985). Cf. T. EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 70-71, 87. When considering statements made in the
relatively distant past this identification will be between the speaker's intention and the ordinary
meanings then associated with that language.
25 "For, if the Framers wrote the Constitution and the text we are reading does not express their
intentions but expresses instead the intentions of someone else, why is it the Constitution?"
Michaels, Fate, supra note 21, at 775; see H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92-96 (1961); Maltz,
Appeal, supra note 11, at 17; Munzer, Realistic Limits on Realist Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
459, 472 (1985).
26 See P. JUHL, supra note 21, at 57-58, 85-86. In fact, it is hard to imagine practical situations
of any kind where we actually prefer interpreting in accordance with some standard abstract mean-
ing to interpreting according to the speaker's intention when we have good evidence of that inten-
tion:
Arnold Isenberg has related the following incident. A foreign colleague of his would some-
times come into their office and say "'Please don't make trouble' " which he (Isenberg) "could
easily interpret" as "'Please, do not trouble yourself on my account.'" The example illustrates
the fact that ordinarily we do not, so to speak, strictly enforce the rules of the language. That is,
we do not ordinarily take a man to have said, or his utterance to mean, what we know or believe
he did not mean (on the basis of our knowledge about the speaker, his facial expressions, ges-
tures, what else he says, and so on), even if the rules of the language do not allow the sentence
he uttered to mean what he intended to convey.
Id. at 107-08 (footnotes omitted) (citing Isenberg, Some Problems of Interpretation in AESTHETICS
AND THE THEORY OF CRITICISM 208 (W. Callaghan ed. 1973)).
That is, in responding by word and action to language we encounter, we are usually interested
in the utterance of words because we are interested in the point of the utterance. See C. ALTIERI,
ACT AND QUALITY 81-84, 102-03 (1981). See also L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGA-
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amine an extreme example of the consequences of a "pure text" ap-
proach. In Cernauskas v. Fletcher,27 the Supreme Court of Arkansas
construed a state statute setting forth the conditions under which munici-
palities were authorized to vacate streets and alleys. The court was par-
ticularly concerned with whether the statute eliminated the municipal
discretion granted by an earlier statute. The last section of the new stat-
ute read: "All laws and parts of laws and particularly Act 311 of the
Acts of 1941 are hereby repealed."'28 The text itself, understood accord-
ing to the ordinary use of the words employed, would give this provision
an alarming sweep. The court, however, had little difficulty construing it
more narrowly: "No doubt the legislature meant to repeal all laws in
conflict with that act, and by error of the author or the typist, left out the
usual words 'in conflict herewith,' which we will imply by necessary con-
struction. '29 Why does this result seem so plainly correct when it is so
patently at odds with the words of the statute itself? It is because we
believe the statutory obligation does not emanate from the mere words of
the provision but from the act of legislation, and we know the legislators
did not intend to repeal all prior laws. Legal obligations arise because we
recognize law-making authority vested in certain human beings. 30 It is
to that exercise of human will in making the relevant law that we refer in
statutory construction. 3'
We can conceive of a legal system that recognized is binding rules
interpreted in some predefined conventional way whose only claim to
TIONS 20e, 128e, 138e (G. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1973); Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory 2:
Hermeneutics and Deconstruction, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 49, 54 (1987).
27 21 Ark. 678, 201 S.W.2d 999 (1947). The "plain words" of the statute were given a more
sympathetic reading in Poisson v. d'Avril, 244 Ark. 478A (1968) reported in R. MEGARRY, A SEc-
OND MISCELLANY AT LAW 185 (1973) in which the court held the repeal applied to all statutes but
not to the common law which was found "too wonderful to be lightly tampered with." Id. at 187.
The editor reports the following suspicious circumstances: The case appeared only in the advance
sheets and its pages were numbered 478A-478E. It included expressions of dissent by five of the six
judges sitting. Finally, consistent with its caption, it was issued on April 1. Id. at 189. I am grateful
to my colleague, Loftus Becker, for bringing the case to my attention.
28 21 Ark. at 680, 201 S.W.2d at 1000.
29 Id. See also Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. 179, 204-05 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court in United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985), erred in applying the apparent meaning in contradiction to an
obviously intended meaning).
30 See H. HART, supra note 25, at 92-96; Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation", 43 HARV.
L. REV. 886, 886-88 (1929-30). Law-making authority exists either by virtue of some other pre-
existing rule of law or, finally, by virtue of a fundamental social and political judgment as to the
source of law. See H. HART, supra note 25, at 103-07. The authority of constitution-makers is
necessarily of this latter kind. See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 187 (1981).
31 But cf Moore, supra note 16, at 252-53 (suggesting that the text should control any contrary
expression of intent). As a practical matter, the lawmaker's choice of language may make determi-
nation of his intent difficult or impossible. But, as the discussion of the Cernauskas case makes clear,
courts can, and sometimes do, give effect to the lawmaker's intended meaning even when it conflicts
with some other meaning reasonably associated with the words of the law alone.
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authority is that they were found in a certain book. Similarly, we might
govern ourselves by rules inferred from the entrails of sacrificed animals.
But such a system has little resemblance to ours. For us, the force of law
derives from the authority of the lawmaker.3 2
Support for the view that text alone creates legal rules might be
drawn from the English practice of statutory interpretation. English
judges, in construing an act of Parliament, may not seek guidance from
legislative debates or other legislative material associated with its enact-
ment.33 But English courts have never suggested that the lawmaker's
intent is not the critical object sought in statutory construction. The rule
that the judge cannot consult legislative history merely limits the means
by which that intent can be found.34 English courts still adhere to the
well-established maxim that a judge is to construe statutes in light of the
mischief the lawmaker was attempting to correct.3 5 Especially in earlier
periods when legislative records were skimpy and unreliable, it was rea-
sonable for judges to avoid entanglement in potentially misleading
records. An English judge, however, like his American counterpart, is
obliged to depart from a meaning apparent on the face of the law when,
as in Cernauskas, such a conventional interpretation would lead to ab-
surd consequences.3 6 This "golden rule" of statutory construction only
makes sense if we postulate a duty to adhere to a presumably rational
legislature and not simply to words discovered on paper. The English
rule is best understood, therefore, as a rule of administration for deter-
mining the original intentions. While it has continued to govern the
32 "No one would even try to interpret the Constitution if everyone thought it had been put
together by a tribe of monkeys with quills." Michaels, Fate, supra note 21, at 774. See Maltz, New
Thoughts, supra note 11, at 833; Monaghan, Perfect, supra note 11, at 374-76; Perry, supra note 15,
at 598-99.
33 "The one thing which stands out beyond all question is that in a Court of Law you are not
allowed to introduce observations made either by the Government or by anybody else, but the Court
will only give consideration to the Statute itself." 94 PARL. DEB. 5th series, Lords, col. 232, Nov. 8,
1934 cited in F. FRANKFURTER, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READINGS OF STATUTES 22 (1947);
see 2A A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.02 (4th ed. 1984).
34 See Dickerson, supra note 24, at 218.
35 [The] intention [of the legislature] is to be the guide of our course in case any difficulty
should arise in the construction of a particular clause .... [Tihe construction of the statute then
under consideration before them must be made, "by inquiring what was the mischief and defect
against which the common law did not provide? what remedy the Parliament had appointed to
cure the disease of the commonwealth? and what was the true reason of the remedy?" and the
observation which follows in the Report is one that ought never to be lost sight of in any case,
and is peculiarly applicable to the present, namely, "that the office of all Judges is always to
make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to
add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act,
pro bono publico." This principle of construction has always been adopted by courts ofjustice.
Warburton v. Loveland, 2 Dow & Clark 480, 490, 496-97, [1831-32] E. R. 806, 810, 812. (Ir. Exch.
Ch.) (quoting Heydon's Case, 3 Coke Reports 7 (1584)); see E. COKE, 4 INsTiruTEs 330 (1809).
36 See, e.g., River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 742, 746 (H.L. 1877) (Black-
burn, J.) quoted in H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1144 (tent. ed. 1958); Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965); A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 33, at § 45.12.
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practice of statutory interpretation in Britain, in this country, of course,
the practice has long been to the contrary. 37 The aim of both interpretive
methods may be understood as ascertaining the intent of the lawmakers.
The arguments I have advanced thus far for interpretation based on
the intent of the lawmaker, as opposed to interpretation based on some
abstract meaning inferred from the text alone, apply with at least as
much strength to constitutional interpretation. Unlike statutes, the au-
thority of the Constitution does not derive from any legal authority
vested in its makers. The creation of the Constitution in 1787 was not an
act sanctioned by some pre-existing positive law. If anything, it was an
act in defiance of the constitutional amendment procedure provided by
the Articles of Confederation. 38 But this does not mean the Constitu-
tion's authority comes from the fact that its words are inscribed on a
certain parchment located in the national archives. Its force derives from
the historical and political events surrounding its creation and the regard
in which those events were and continue to be held. There may be plau-
sible theories of government and judicial review which demote the au-
thority of both intention and text, but it is hard to see what the political
rationale would be for a theory that elevates a text for reasons unrelated
to the people and circumstances which created it.
In fact, explicit and direct recourse to the original intentions may be
more necessary in constitutional than in statutory interpretation because
erroneous interpretations of statutes are more easily corrected by the leg-
islature. Therefore, a judge attempting to ascertain the original inten-
tions of a constitution's drafters may feel more compelled to make a
deliberate historical investigation of that intention, rather than rely on
the conventional sense of the language itself.39 Thus, while Canadian
courts initially adopted the English rule in cases of constitutional inter-
pretation,40 under the pressure of experience, they have increasingly re-
sorted to legislative history in constitutional cases. 4 1
As a practical matter, an approach which relies on ordinary mean-
ings will usually result in the same interpretation that would follow from
original intentions adjudication. We expect the constitution-makers to
use words according to ordinary usage at the time of enactment.4 2 The
37 See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921); A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 33,
at § 48.03.
38 See Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONsT. COMM. 57 (1987).
39 These arguments parallel those sometimes made for a reduced force to stare decisis in the
constitutional context. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
40 See P. HOGG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 342 (2d ed. 1985). The Constitution Act,
1867 (previously titled the British North America Act, 1867), which has provided the basis for most
Canadian constitutional adjudication, was an act of the British Parliament, and courts, at first more
or less naturally, applied ordinary rules of statutory construction to it. See, e.g., Attorney-General
for Ontario v. Winner, [1954] App. Cas. 541 (P.C.).
41 See, eg., Re Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54, 66-67.
42 See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
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best evidence of the enactors' intent is the language they used.43 Indeed,
in many cases, any other conclusion is so unlikely that an explicit refer-
ence to extrinsic evidence of intent is unnecessary."4 Certainly, when
most readers agree that a particular clause or phrase means one thing,
the burden of persuasion ought to be on the advocate of some other
meaning. Such a presumption is fully consistent with original intentions
adjudication and a convenient rule of administration. 45
What I mean by original intentions adjudication should also be dis-
tinguished from two other possible versions of that idea. The first calls
for adjudication to be governed by the general moral or political beliefs of
the constitution-makers without regard to whether or not those beliefs
were codified in the Constitution. In contrast, the model I propose only
determines a usable meaning for the rules contained in the written Con-
stitution. The intent of the constitution-makers is referred to only in
connection with that enterprise.46 This model is not directly concerned
with the general philosophy, aspirations, and preferences held by the en-
actors.47 These general influences should be consulted only insofar as
they shed light on the intended scope of the constitutional rule in
question.
The second and related variation calls for the specific questions in-
1, 89-90 (1823). See also Dickerson, supra note 24, at 209 ("To assume differently is to assume that
the purpose is to deceive or confuse (which, fortunately, is the rare exception)."); Grice, Meaning, 66
PHIL. REv. 377, 387 (1957). Cf. Brest, supra note 6, at 206-08 (plain meaning includes social as well
as linguistic context).
43 J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusr 16 (1980). See also R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 27 (1983). The force of this observation is
particularly great where, as in the case of the constitutional ratifiers, we are concerned with the
intentions associated with approving language chosen by other people. See infra text accompanying
notes 85-92.
44 It is this common sense idea that underlies the well known "plain meaning rule" whereby
recourse to extrinsic evidence of legislative intent is proper only where the text of the statute betrays
an ambiguity. See A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 33, at § 46.01. But see Harrison v. Northern Trust
Co., 317 U.S. 476, 476-79 (1943) (legislative history may be consulted no matter how clear the words
of the statutes appear).
45 See the discussion of the English rule of statutory interpretation supra text accompanying
notes 34-37.
46 The relevant intentions are those of the human beings whose assent was necessary to give the
Constitution the force of law. See infra text accompanying notes 82-102. I generally will refer to
these people as "constitution-makers" or "enactors."
47 Why should anyone with common sense wish to equate an author's textual meaning with
all the meanings he happened to entertain when he wrote? Some of these he had no intention of
conveying by his words. Any author knows that written verbal utterances can convey only
verbal meanings-that is to say, meanings which can be conveyed to others by the words he
uses .... It betrays a totally inadequate conception of verbal meaning to equate it with what the
author "has in mind." The only question that can relevantly be at issue is whether the verbal
meaning which an author intends is accessible to the interpreter of his text.
E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 17-18. See P. JUHL, supra note 21, at 14; Maltz, Constitutional
Originalism, supra note 11, at 49.
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volved in constitutional litigation to be decided in the way the framers
would decide them if they could somehow be asked the questions.48 My
approach is quite different from such a hypothetical seance. It does not
involve some intention relating to the decision of a particular case. It is,
rather, an approach as to the proper method of applying the enacted
constitutional rule to the regulation of specific controversies. The consti-
tution-makers' preferences are relevant only insofar as they tell us what
the constitution-makers did when they made that rule. The judge should
ask what the constitution-makers intended to effect in enacting the
Constitution.49
III. FIRST OBJECTION: IT'S IMPOSSIBLE
The first objection to original intentions adjudication-that it is im-
possible-is divisible into two somewhat different arguments. The first
and more extreme argument asserts that it is conceptually impossible to
ascertain the lawmaker's original intentions in such a way as to make
them applicable to real instances of constitutional adjudication. The sec-
ond argument concedes the theoretical possibility of discovering and us-
ing the relevant intentions, but claims that, as a practical matter, the
difficulties associated with that enterprise will frustrate any application to
actual cases. The considerations bearing on both arguments overlap and
the response to one may well be appropriate in dealing with the other.
Nevertheless, sufficient distinctions exist to justify treating them
separately.
A. It's Really Impossible
The objection that original intentions adjudication is really impossi-
ble is founded on an extreme and general proposition about the capacity
of human beings to communicate a determinate meaning through the
medium of language. The argument suggests that because linguistic
communication is impossible, it is futile for judges to attempt to learn the
intentions of the constitution-makers by studying what they said or what
other people said about them.
Some legal scholars have taken positions similar to this by adopting
the views of writers in the fields of philosophy and literary criticism. 50 In
particular, some writers have attempted to apply post-structuralist or
48 See Bennett, supra note 16, at 472; Schauer, supra note 16, at 809.
49 See M. Oakeshott, The Rule of Law in ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 117, 146 (1983);
Maltz, Appeal, supra note 11, at 30; Perry, supra note 15, at 599. Thus, the fact that an enactor
favored a provision because he received a bribe is irrelevant to his intent with respect to the effect of
the rule. Similarly, the fact that he voted for a provision because he wanted to benefit a particular
interest would not convert a rule intended to operate in a certain manner into a general injunction to
benefit the party he wanted to favor. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE
L.J. 743, 783 (1987).
50 See, ag., Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58
236
82:226 (1988) Adherence to the Original Intentions
deconstructionist literary theory to the law. 51 It would be wrong to lump
together scholars whose work is in some respects very different, but it
seems possible to identify some of the notions identified with these
schools that appear to have influenced legal writers who find original
intentions adjudication unsupportable.
The main idea that emerges from the legal reading of such scholar-
ship is that no text is so simple and clear as to admit of any permanent,
single, correct meaning. Various reasons underly this conclusion. Some
critics argue that every text, particularly if dependent on metaphor, is
sufficiently complex to contain the converse of any and every suggested
meaning.52 Such contradictions become apparent if the text is exposed to
sufficiently careful analysis.5 3 Other critics emphasize that variability of
meaning is a necessary consequence of the multiplicity of readers. Every
act of interpretation is a shared enterprise between the text (and its au-
thor) and the reader. The consequences of that enterprise depend not
only on what the text contains but on the outlook, expectations, and
preconceptions of the reader.5 4 Interpretation must, therefore, vary from
S. CAL. L. REV. 35 (1985); Levinson, Law As Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982); Peller, The
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151 (1985).
51 An introduction to such theories may be found in T. EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 133-39.
52 See id.; Poster, Interpreting Texts: Some New Directions, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 15, 16-17 (1985).
53 See F. KERMODE, THE ART OF TELLING: ESSAYS ON FICTION 202 (1983) ("IThe decon-
structionists mean to tell you what a text is saying in spite of itself,"); C. NORRIS, DECONSTRUC-
TION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 48-49 (1982); Goodrich, Historical Aspects of Legal Interpretation,
61 IND. L.J. 331, 332, n.6 (1986); Searle, The World Turned Upside Down (Book Review), N.Y. Rev.
of Books, Oct. 27, 1983, at 74.
54 See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 112-46 (1980) (Fish qualifies his understand-
ing of the reader's contribution to meaning in later essays in the same book).
The variability of meaning according to reader is also an important theme in the work of Hans-
Georg Gadamer. See, eg., H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 304 (1975):
[A]ll reading involves application, so that a person reading a text is himself part of the meaning
he apprehends. He belongs to the text that he is reading. It will always happen that the line of
meaning that is revealed to him as he reads it necessarily breaks off in an open indefiniteness.
He can, indeed he must, accept the fact that future generations will understand differently what
he has read in the text.
See also id. at 263-65, 271-72. Gadamer also insists, however, on a critical but still partial role for
the author in shaping the reader's understanding. That understanding is further constrained by a
tradition of which both text and reader are a part. See id. at 267-74. See also Hoy, Interpreting the
Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 135 (1985). On the role
of the reader, see also, R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 57-58; F. KERMODE, supra note 53, at 203; R.
PALMER, HERMENEUTICS 51 (1969); Brest, supra note 6, at 221-22 (discussing Gadamer); Patter-
son, Interpretation in Law-Toward A Reconstruction of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REv. 671,
681 (1983-84) (describing "nihilist" tendencies in modem literary criticism); Peller, supra note 50, at
1172-74.
The two features of modem criticism discussed in the text naturally interrelate as it is the
availability of multiple meanings which gives room for the subjective preconceptions of individual
readers to assert themselves. See Carter, ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A
Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE LJ. 821, 823-24 (1985).
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reader to reader, from era to era or from group to group.55 These
properties of interpretation are not the result of mere defects in particular
communications or interpretation; rather, they inhere in the very nature
of linguistic expression. Every text is indeterminate. Original intentions
adjudication, which instructs judges to inquire into the intended meaning
of certain historical expressions, necessarily falters because not only is
the constitutional text indeterminate but the statements of and about the
creators of that text are also indeterminate. The historical investigation
that such an approach demands will only lead to deeper and deeper levels
of obscurity.
These assertions are not convincing. In the first place, even if they
are apt descriptions of literary interpretation, it does not necessarily fol-
low that they equally illuminate legal interpretation.5 6 In the second
place, there are very serious doubts whether these theories plausibly re-
construct our use of language in general.
The experiences of interpreting legal and literary texts differ sub-
stantially. Legal and literary texts are created for quite different pur-
poses and exhibit those differences; the reasons for reading legal rules
diverge markedly from the reasons for reading fiction or poetry; different
kinds of people have been associated with the explication of legal and
literary writings. These differences reinforce each other. It is, therefore,
unlikely that the theories and claims of literary criticism can be trans-
ferred to questions of legal interpretation without significant
qualifications.
For example, there is more pressure upon judges and lawyers to
come up with the one "best" interpretation of a text than there is on
literary critics. To be successful, a practitioner of literary criticism must
discover new and interesting readings of literary texts. A poem's value
may be multiplied indefinitely as new ways to look at and learn from it
are developed. The same poem may appeal to different people in differ-
ent ways or to the same person in several ways. The satisfaction we de-
rive from literature may be enhanced, not diminished, by multiple and
even contradictory interpretations.57 Indeed, in the literary context, the
very word "interpretation" sometimes incorporates this idea of multiple
meanings in a way quite different from legal interpretation. Such inter-
pretation may be analogous to what we mean when we refer to the "in-
55 See S. FISH, supra note 54, at 275 ("[Words] always and only mean one thing, although that
one thing is not always the same."); Hoy, supra note 54, at 138-39 (discussing Gadamer).
56 This is not to say that these approaches have not been seriously applied to non-literary texts.
There have been particularly noteworthy attempts to "deconstrucet" the writings of philosophers.
See C. NORRIS, THE DECONSTRUCTIVE TURN (1983).
57 Wallace Stevens said that "a poem consists of all the constructions that can be placed upon
it." M. BATES, WALLACE STEVENs: A MYTHOLOGY OF SELF 128 (1985) (quoting Wallace Ste-
vens); see J. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORY 6-7 (1971); Hoy, supra note 54, at 167-69 (distinguishing limitations on literary and other
forms of interpretation).
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terpretation" of a musical composition. In that case, a performer's
"interpretation" of a composer's work depends on the idiosyncratic
rather than the common elements of his performance.5 8
In contrast, the value of multiple interpretations of legal texts is far
more controversial. There is a conventional wisdom about permitting a
rule of law to "keep pace with the times," suggesting the utility of chang-
ing meanings.59 But there is an equally powerful tradition of seeing a
legal rule as having only one "correct" interpretation. This position is
based on the idea that the law exists, in part, to influence human behav-
ior in predictable ways. The idea of multiple interpretations of legal rules
is plainly at war with this widely held view of the function of law60 be-
cause it creates uncertainty as to what the law requires and allows. Thus
lawyers and judges have traditionally been much more concerned with
arriving at a single valid interpretation61 than their literary counterparts.
Consequently, as a matter of fact, legal interpreters feel far greater con-
straints in the process of interpretation and may perceive far fewer per-
missible readings. They may find themselves-in terms Owen Fiss has
borrowed from Stanley Fish-members of a specialized "interpretive
community," a community that severely limits the subjective preconcep-
tions they bring to a text.62
58 See E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 112 (discussing Betti's distinction between re-cognitive (his-
torical and literary), presentational (musical and dramatic) and normative (legal and biblical) types
of textual interpretation). Jerome Frank compared musical and statutory interpretation in an article
that ignored the differences discussed in the above text. See Frank, Words and Music: Some Re-
marks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947). It is possible to think of a
musical work as a kind of charter of permissions and restrictions governing the acts of the per-
former. Looking at it that way makes the interpretation much more like legal interpretation. See
Crutchfield, Opera and The Constitution, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1987, at C22, col. 3. My thinking on
the relationship between musical and legal interpretation has been clarified in useful discussions with
my colleagues, Hugh Macgill and Carol Weisbrod.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 309-13. E.D. Hirsch, who is conspicuously identified with
the advocacy of literary interpretation based on discovering an author's intention, took the position
that the need for adaptability over time of documents like the Constitution argues against "re-cogni-
tive" constitutional interpretation which requires reconstruction of the intention of the author. See
E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 123-25. His views on this question seem to have altered somewhat
since then. See Hirsch, Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 202, 218-19
(1984).
60 See Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX.
L.J. 433, 434 (1986); Stone, Introduction: Interpreting the Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5
(1985). For a discussion of practical problems involved with abandoning the idea of a single valid
meaning in adjudication, see Hoy, supra note 54, at 167-69; Levinson, supra note 50, at 401 n.117
(quoting Richard Rorty: "I confess that I tremble at the thought of Barthian readings in law schools
...." Letter from Rorty to Sanford Levinson (Apr. 28, 1981) (copy on file with Texas Law
Review)).
61 See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 80-130, 279-90 (1978); R. PALMER, supra
note 54, at 56-60 (discussing the influence on Betti's theory of interpretation of the fact that he
approached the subject as a historian of law).
62 See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 744-47 (1982); Fish, Fish V.
Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325, 1333-34 (1984).
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Thus, the argument that determinate interpretations of legal texts is
impossible because every text has unlimited possibilities and every reader
irrepressible eccentricities may be theoretically true, but it has little rele-
vance to the actual choices encountered in adjudication. Indeed, some
literary critics and philosophers have made clear that their observations
pertain only to the possibilities inherent in language and are not sugges-
tions as to what actual readers do or ought to do in concrete situations.6 3
A second argument against the use of these theories of indetermi-
nacy is more general. They are highly controversial among scholars of
philosophy and literary criticism. I have already referred to those writers
63 Deconstruction neither denies nor really affects the commonsense view that language exists
to communicate meaning. It suspends that view for its own specific purpose of seeing what
happens when the writs of convention no longer run.
Scepticism in philosophy has always borne this ambiguous relation to the 'natural' or com-
monsense attitude. Its proponents have never pretended that life could be conducted in a prac-
tical way if everyone acted consistently on sceptical assumptions. What would such
'consistency' amount to, indeed, if one denied the very bases of reason and logical coherence?
This is not to say that the sceptics' questions are trivial or totally misconceived. They are-as I
have tried to show with Derrida-questions that present themselves compulsively as soon as one
abandons the commonsense position. But language continues to communicate, as life goes on,
despite all the problems thrown up by sceptical thought.
C. NORRIS, supra note 53, at 128. One writer has claimed that certain American versions of decon-
struction that deny "the existence of anything but discourse" or affirm "a realm of pure difference in
which all meaning and identity dissolves" are "a travesty of Derrida's own work." T. EAGLETON,
supra note 21, at 148.
In addition to theories of literary interpretation, recent discussions have drawn on the parallels
found in Biblical interpretation. On its face, this presents a more apt analogy because the text to be
interpreted, unlike most literary texts, is normally consulted in its normative and imperative aspects.
It is presumed to be the source of rules binding on human conduct. See Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. RaV. 1, 2-3 (1984); Perry, supra note 15, at 561-62; Hoy, supra note 54, at
167. Some writers reject the propriety of original intentions adjudication citing modern theories of
biblical interpretation that incorporate experience, tradition, interpretive history, and so forth. See
Garet, supra note 50, at 120-34; Perry, supra note 15, at 557-61. Cf Grey, supra at 10-13, 21-25.
Of course, there are other views on Biblical interpretation that are at least as well-established
and that stress the duty of the interpreter to discover the original intention of the writer of the
Biblical text:
[Tihe heart of biblical study should lie in an attempt to understand what the texts meant as they
were originally written by a specific person (or group), directed toward a specific group of per-
sons, in a specific setting, to speak to the needs of those people in that setting. In short, what
did the texts originally mean?
J. EFIRD, How TO INTERPRET THE BIBLE vi (1984); see Thomas, Issues of Biblical Interpretation, 58
S. CAL. L. REv. 29, 30-34 (1985); Goodrich, supra note 53, at 342; see also H. FREI, THE ECLIPSE
OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE: A STUDY IN EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURY HERMENEU-
TIcs 42, 77-79, 90, 107-08 (1974).
The issues in biblical interpretation are quite similar to those in legal interpretation, although
the stakes in the former may be much higher than in the latter. But biblical interpretation offers a
special problem of identification of the correct author, as it can be seen to involve both a divine and
human one. The methods of ascertaining the divine intention may not coincide with those for dis-
covering the human ones. See H. FREI, supra at 73-74. Biblical interpretation, therefore, can be
informative but hardly dispositive of the questions of legal interpretation.
Interestingly, Max Radin thought recourse to the author's intention was sensible in literature
and theology but not in law. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 866-67
(1929-30).
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who find the very idea of intentionless meaning to be incoherent. 64 Other
critics, most prominently E.D. Hirsch, do not go so far but argue, none-
theless, that interpretation directed at ascertaining the intention of a
text's author is both possible and desirable. Hirsch premises his argu-
ment, in part, on the need for a single, stable, valid interpretation and on
the need to separate textual interpretation from judgments regarding the
text's merits and its significance in particular times and circumstances.
His theory thus focuses on the same concerns as legal interpretation.65
The extreme position is also inconsistent with the work of some twenti-
eth-century philosophers of language, notably Wittgenstein and Austin,
who understood language as part of the means employed by individuals
to accomplish their objectives. 66 Our job in trying to understand lan-
guage is to discern those objectives. We can accomplish this only by
participating in, or investigating, the system of conventions people use in
a given time and place and by considering the likelihood of various objec-
tives in light of the particular circumstances in which language is used-
that is, by considering the "context" of the particular utterance.67
It would be, therefore, a great mistake to assume that non-legal dis-
ciplines have somehow "discovered" something about interpretation, and
that when that discovery is applied to law, original intentions adjudica-
64 See P. JUHL, supra note 21; Knapp & Michaels, supra note 21; Michaels, Fate, supra note 21;
Michaels, Response, supra note 21.
65 See generally E. HIRSCH, supra note 23; Hirsch, The Politics of Theories of Interpretation, in
THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 320 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983). See also McIntosh, Legal Herme-
neutics: A Philosophical Critique, 35 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 1 (1982).
66 For Wittgenstein, in his later writing, meaning was not some inherent relationship between
words and their referents but a consequence of the successful execution of linguistic practice in social
life. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 26, at 137e:
491. Not: "Without language we could not communicate with one another"-but for sure:
without language we cannot influence other people in such-and-such ways; cannot build roads
and machines, etc..[sic] And also: without the use of speech and writing people could not com-
municate.
See also id. at 20e, 128e (Nos. 43, 432); S. KRIPKE, WITGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LAN-
GUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY EXPOSITION 73-79 (1982); T. MORAWETZ, WITTGENSTEIN AND
KNOWLEDGE 58 (1978).
Austin distinguished between those aspects of speech which merely express a meaning (locutio-
nary force) and those which look to the achievement of results (illocutionary force). This instrumen-
tal aspect of language is, perhaps, most explicit in the legal context and Austin relied substantially on
the experience of the law. See J. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 99-121 (1975). This
aspect of legal language also provides an ordinarily apparent context which facilitates inference of
the original intention and which further distinguishes legal from literary interpretation. See T.
EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 88, 113-14 (for a discussion of literary interpretation); see also A.
KENNY, FREEWILL AND RESPONSIBILITY 11-12 (1978); Kavka, Wittgenstein and Political Theory,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1455, 1460-62 (1974); Patterson, supra note 54, at 682-87; Searle, Reiterating the
Differences: A Reply to Derrida, 1 GLYPH 198, 202 (1977).
67 See T. MORAWETZ, supra note 66, at 58-61; Graff, "Keep Off the Grass, " "Drop Dead," and
Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 408-10 (1982). Our
interest in the context of an utterance is further evidence of the fact that our concern in interpreta-
tion is ordinarily with the writer's or speaker's intention. See P. JUHL, supra note 21, at 90-99.
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tion is seen to be impossible. When considering the possibilities and
techniques of interpretation in philosophy and literature, as in law, we
find no accepted conclusions, only controversies. 68 In each area we must
decide which view is suitable in light of the experience and needs of the
enterprise.
The most glaring problem with the extreme position that interpreta-
tion according to original intentions is impossible, when applied to the
use of language in general, is that it is wildly counterintuitive. It is in-
consistent with the way people carry on their lives every day. We all
confidently proceed on the assumption that we are capable of communi-
cating through words a single determinate intention and that we are ca-
pable of understanding the single, determinate intentions of others. Most
of the time our confidence is well-founded. We arrive at the right place
for the right meetings at more or less the right time. We read and discuss
articles with the impression that we are talking about the same thing.
We stop at stop signs, file our tax returns, and obey subpoenas. All these
commonplace experiences testify powerfully against the claim that the
inference of a determinate meaning from a sequence of words uttered in a
particular context is essentially, and always, impossible.69 Put another
way, even if it were true that multiple contradictory meanings were bur-
ied in every text, and that every reader and reading injects a potential
subjectivity in interpretation, people can and do ignore some of the possi-
ble meanings and suppress their personal idiosyncrasies in both speaking
and understanding. 70 This selectivity is exercised in a sufficiently uni-
form pattern so as to create our familiar medium of communication. 71
Of course, such behavior is not inevitable and there may be truly unsuc-
cessful attempts to communicate. In some cases usage will be so eccen-
tric or context so inaccessible that attempts at a single interpretation will
be fruitless. 72 But to refute the extreme position under discussion, it is
only necessary that this not always be the case-the common experiences
mentioned above make this obvious.
The most telling response to this objection is simply that no one
really believes it, not even the writers who make the objection. If they
did, they would not use language to advance the argument. These "im-
possibility" theories amount to what John Finnis has called "operation-
68 See Miller, A Rhetoric of Law (Book Review), 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 247, 255-56 (1985).
69 See C. ALTIERI, supra note 26, at 40; Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 404-15
(1985).
70 See Hirsch, supra note 65, at 326.
71 See S. KRIPKE, supra note 66, at 91-98. Such uniformity of response defines what Fish calls
"interpretive communities." See S. FISH, supra note 54, at 170-73. The deconstructive strategy calls
attention to this artificial suppression of one set of possibilities and "privileging" of another. See
Balkin, supra note 49, at 764.
72 That is, we may not be able to discover the circumstances surrounding a particular utterance.
See E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 18-19; Graff, supra note 67, at 408-10. I argue below this is un-
likely to be the case with most constitutional language. See infra text accompanying notes 112-13.
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ally self-refuting propositions"-those that "are inevitably falsified by
any assertion of them."'73 The point is put strikingly in the following
passage from a Chinese philosopher:
To hold that all speech is perverse is not permissible. If the speech of the
man who says so is permissible, then all speech is not perverse since there it
is permissible. But if his speech is not permissible, then it is wrong to take
it as being correct.74
B. It's Too Hard
The more moderate form of the impossibility objection to original
intentions adjudication-It's too hard-appears much more plausible. It
concedes that language is sometimes capable of communicating a
speaker's or writer's intentions, but holds that interpretation of the
American Constitution creates peculiar problems which make the rele-
vant original intentions inaccessible.
Under this objection, two features of constitutional interpretation
are ordinarily emphasized. First, it is argued that because the original
intentions involved are not the intentions of individuals, but of law-mak-
ing bodies (that is, Congress, legislatures, and constitutional conventions)
the distilling of a single intention is virtually impossible.75 Second, it is
argued that the distance in time between the constitutional utterances
and the attempts at understanding is now so great that it is extremely
difficult to discover the original intentions.76 The intervening time also
brings forth new problems not addressed by the enactors.
Before addressing these criticisms, it is necessary to explain precisely
what original intentions adjudication requires of judges in the context of
actual litigation. No judge is ever required to answer the abstract ques-
tion: "What did the enactors intend by the phrase 'due process of law'?"
Rather, judges must decide in a specific case whether or not, given the
original intentions of the constitution-makers, a particular governmental
action deprives someone of liberty or property without due process of
law. The difference between the two questions is critically important. It
is much easier to answer the second than the first because the alternatives
are binary. The question can and can only be answered "yes" or "no,"
73 J. FINNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 74 (1980). A number of writers have
made this observation. David Hoy has written that "[a] theory of interpretation concluding that
undecidability is inevitable is by reductio shown to be wrong. Since it could not decide the truth-
values of its own claims, it could not exclude contradictory principles, and thus refutes itself." Hoy,
supra note 54, at 171. In a similar vein, M.H. Abrams has called this form of objection "suicidal."
Abrams, How To Do Things With Texts, 1979 PARTISAN REv. 566, 568, 587; C. NORRIS, supra note
53, at 126; Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust,
and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. LJ. 89, 101 (1984); Patterson, supra note 54, at 689; Schauer, supra
note 69, at 417.
74 J. POCOCK, supra note 57, at 59 (quoting "a later disciple of Mo Tzu").
75 See infra text accompanying notes 82-102.
76 See infra text accompanying notes 103-13.
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and since the judge must give some answer, it follows that he need not
answer with certainty. All he needs to do is decide which of the two
possible answers in that case is more likely correct.77
Defining the judge's task as that of choosing which of two outcomes
is more likely consistent with original intentions is particularly important
in light of criticisms that stress the impossibility of ascertaining those
intentions with sufficient certainty. 78 It is true that we can never know
the original intentions with certainty, but then we can never know any
speaker's or writer's intent with certainty. Nevertheless, it is almost al-
ways possible to examine the constitutional text and other evidence of
intent associated with it and make a reasonable, good faith judgment
about which result is more likely consistent with that intent.79 Of course
confidence in these judgments will be different in different situations, but
one answer will almost always appear better than the other.8 0 Indeed,
one of the two possible responses may be obviously incorrect because,
while it is theoretically possible that the lawmakers held such an inten-
tion, the available historical evidence will be overwhelmingly against it.81
77 This discussion is premised on the assumption that original intentions adjudication requires
decision-making based exclusively on an interpretation of the Constitution intended by its creators.
Given that assumption, the better answer will always be the one that more closely conforms to those
intentions. One could adopt a model that requires some minimum level of confidence in the pre-
ferred alternative in order to justify holding a governmental action unconstitutional. See Thayer,
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893).
But to adopt this latter model is to introduce an element-here, the stipulated presumption of consti-
tutionality-that cannot itself be justified by the original intentions.
78 See, ag., Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEx. L. RaV. 1207, 1240-43 (1984). Cf. Schauer, supra note 69,
at 437 n.99 ("It is currently fashionable to make sport of the ability to determine original intent with
any degree of certainty.").
79 It is a logical mistake to confuse the impossibility of certainty in understanding with the
impossibility of understanding. It is a similar, though more subtle, mistake to identify knowl-
edge with certainty. A good many disciplines do not pretend to certainty, and the more sophis-
ticated the methodology of the discipline, the less likely that its goal will be defined as certainty
of knowledge. Since genuine certainty in interpretation is impossible, the aim of the discipline
must be to reach a consensus, on the basis of what is known, that correct interpretation has
probably been achieved. The issue is not whether certainty is accessible to the interpreter but
whether the author's intended meaning is accessible to him.
E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 17; see also id. at 173-80; C. ALTIERI, supra note 26, at 50, 226-28; R.
EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 27. The idea that original intentions adjudication requires only a
probability judgment is a somewhat more specific statement of the view that judges interpreting the
Constitution should "do the best they can" notwithstanding the absence of certainty. See, eg.,
Maltz, New Thoughts, supra note 11, at 813; Perry, supra note 15, at 601. On the other hand, Paul
Brest states, "It seems peculiar, to say the least, that the legitimacy of a current doctrine should turn
on the historian's judgment that it seems 'more likely than not,' or even 'rather likely,' that the
adopters intended it some one or two centuries ago." Brest, supra note 6, at 222.
80 It is possible that in some cases the probabilities will balance exactly or that there will be no
evidence either way. See infra text accompanying notes 115-30.
81 See Sherry, supra note 73, at 100. Cf. Toulmin, The Construal of Reality: Criticism in Mod-
ern and Postmodern Science, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 99, 109-10 (W. Mitchell ed.
1983). Some constitutional scholars have concluded that the claim that the fourteenth amendment
reaches most forms of gender discrimination is in this category. See Maltz, New Thoughts, supra
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Thus, we can be uncertain about the intended meaning of a constitutional
provision at the same time we are convinced that it is not consistent with
one of the two contesting positions in a lawsuit. And, given that we have
only two options, that conviction will decide the case.
There is nothing extraordinary in making important decisions this
way. Almost every decision we make and action we take is based on a
judgment of probabilities, often as to the probable intended meaning of
what we read or hear. To insist on certainty would lead to paralysis. In
asking judges to make decisions in this way we demand nothing more or
less than the same kinds of decisions everyone makes everyday.
1. The Problem of Multiple Intentions. -Having clarified my ap-
proach to the actual demands of original intentions adjudication, it is
now possible to turn to the two problems with ascertaining original in-
tentions asserted by critics. The first problem concerns the difficulty of
discerning a single intention when there are multiple constitution-
makers.8 2
In one sense this argument is a variant of the more extreme claim
discussed above. To speak of an intention is to speak of a human mind.
A joint intention cannot be the simple analog of an individual intention
because we cannot easily conceive of a joint or group mind.8 3 But intent
can be attributed to a group without positing the idea of a group mind.
When we speak of such an intention we usually mean that each member
of the group holds an identical individual intention. If a husband and
wife discuss and settle on a list of invitations to a dinner party it seems
perfectly proper to say that they have "an intention" about who their
guests will be. This phenomenon would only be impossible if the couple
could not articulate and communicate their intentions to each other in a
way that let each one know those intentions coincided. I have already
discussed why I believe such communication is not only possible but
common.
84
note 11, at 813; Perry, supra note 15, at 601. Thomas McAffee uses this approach to conclude that
the interpretation of the "privileges or immunities" clause of the fourteenth amendment was misin-
terpreted in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). McAffee, Constitutional Inter-
pretation-The Use and Limitations of Original Intent, 12 U. DAYTON L. REv. 275, 281, 287-88
(1986). Frederick Schauer has made a similar point. See Schauer, supra note 69, at 414-20. He is
primarily concerned, however, with the way in which language alone excludes many cases. For the
reasons discussed, supra text accompanying notes 16-44, 1 think the examples Schauer gives involve
tacit assumptions about lawmakers' intentions. Schauer also suggests that judgments about histori-
cal intent will often be easier than is sometimes assumed. See Schauer, supra note 69, at 436-37.
82 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 315-21; Brennan, supra note 60, at 435; Brest, supra note
6, at 212-13; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 480-81, 487-88 (1981);
Radin, supra note 63, at 870-71; Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 745, 772-80 (1983); Hancher, Dead Letters" Wills and Poems, 60 TEX. L. REv.
507 (1982).
83 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 335-36.
84 See supra notes 64-71.
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Nevertheless, ascertaining the intention of a group is more compli-
cated than discovering the intention of a single person. Many individuals
in different capacities were involved in making the Constitution. In in-
vestigating the original intentions of these individuals, one problem lies
in identifying those people whose coincident intentions created the rele-
vant original intent. This problem is two-fold. First, every constitutional
provision is the product of consideration and approval by different
groups; therefore, we must identify which groups should be counted in
defining the original intention. Second, within a specific group, there will
be a variety of individual intentions and we will have to decide whose
intentions define the intention of the group. Each of these aspects will be
considered in turn.
a. Which groups?-In answering the first question, it is useful to
recall the reason for being concerned with intention in the first place.
The "plain meaning" of the Cernauskas statute could not control because
it did not represent the will of the lawmaker. Recourse to intention is
necessary because only certain people have the authority to make law.
Thus, in constitutional law, we must identify which groups could, by
their approval, give the Constitution the sanction of law.
It is necessary at this point to distinguish between the original Con-
stitution of 1787 and subsequent amendments. We ordinarily treat
amendments as law because they were created in accordance with Article
V. An amendment becomes law when it is ratified by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the States. The intentions of these legislatures is, thus,
essential. But knowing those intentions is not sufficient. According to
Article V, state legislatures may only ratify amendments that have been
proposed by Congress with a two-thirds majority in each House. Thus,
the Senate and House of Representatives are indispensable actors in the
law-making process. In sum, constitutional amendments require identi-
cal intentions in the two Houses of Congress and in thirty-eight state
legislatures.8 5
When we consider the Constitution of 1787, of course, there is no
governing law analogous to Article V that informs us who must agree
before the Constitution acquires the force of law.86 The Constitution was
a clean break with prior existing law.87 This does not mean, however,
that we have no idea whose judgments and approval gave the Constitu-
tion authority. Like any supreme law, the legal character of the Consti-
85 For the sake of simplicity, I am ignoring the alternate procedures for proposal and ratification
provided in Article V. Ratification by state conventions has been used only for the twenty-first
amendment repealing the eighteenth. Proposal by a national convention, called by petition of the
state legislatures, has never occurred. The methodological questions on discerning intent would be
the same.
86 The ratification procedure specified in Article VII does not meet this description since it could
have no greater legal status than the rest of the Constitution.
87 See Kay, supra note 38.
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tution will depend on political beliefs and attitudes in a society about
who has the final right to make law. 88 This is a complex matter I have
addressed at some length elsewhere.89 It is sufficient here to note that the
authority of the Constitution is conventionally and popularly premised
on the understanding that it was the work of "the People" in their origi-
nal, sovereign capacity.90 Actually, the role of "the People" was played
by the special ratifying conventions in the individual states. The drafters
at the Philadelphia Convention could claim no such mandate from "the
people." Some supporters of the Constitution went so far as to disparage
the importance of the Convention, except insofar as it was able to place a
proposal before the state conventions. 91 The inquiry into original intent,
therefore, should focus on the intentions of the various ratifying bodies
who possessed the constituent authority.
With regard to both the body of the Constitution and its amend-
ments, then, the only valid original intentions will be those held in com-
mon by a number of legislative bodies. This conclusion raises an obvious
problem: What if we discover that, though they approved the same texts,
different groups held different intentions so that no single intention can
be applied to a particular question of interpretation? I will return to this
question shortly.92
b. Which individuals within groups?-The very same problem
arises in answering the second question. Once we have found the author-
itative groups, we must find a single intention for each group. Which
individuals' intentions in, say, the Senate or in the Virginia Ratifying
Convention should be considered?
The reasoning employed above can be applied to this problem. We
wish to obtain the group intention because we deem it capable of estab-
lishing an authoritative rule. A given body acts when some number of its
members agree to act. In the ordinary course that number is a majority.
In the case of the Houses of Congress proposing amendments it is-by
virtue of prior governing law-a two-thirds majority. The intention of
the body, therefore, is embodied in the shared intentions of the appropri-
ate majority of its members.
88 This point has been explicated most effectively in H.L.A. Hart's theory of the rule of recogni-
tion. See H. HART, supra note 25, at 104-14.
89 See Kay supra note 30; Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States, 7
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 111 (1984).
90 That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such princi-
ples as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the
whole American Fabric has been erected .... This original and supreme will organizes the
government, and assigns, to different departments, their respective powers.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
91 See 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 295 (remarks of A.
Hamilton), 253 (remarks of J. Wilson) (1966); THE FEDERALIST No. 40 at 247-48 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961); see also infra text accompanying notes 242-45 (concerning the views of Madison).
92 See infra text accompanying notes 93-100.
82:226 (1988)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
One consequence of this reasoning is that only the intentions of
those voting in favor of the constitutional provision at issue will be rele-
vant. The intentions of dissenters may be useful in illuminating the in-
tention of the proponents, but they are not a part of the authoritative
intention. Dissenters neither contributed nor were necessary to the event
which made the text law and, for reasons already discussed, our concern
is with the intentions of the lawmakers. Proper inquiry, therefore, is re-
stricted to the members of the majority.
As we saw earlier when there were numerous law-making bodies,
however, there may be more than one intention in the majority that ap-
proves the very same act of legislation. The difficulty will be even greater
here because the number of potential intentions will be larger. When we
multiply the number of possible intentions in a legislature by the number
of possible intentions among legislative bodies the task of determining
one original intention might appear hopeless.
c. Summing different intentions.-The possibility of multiple, va-
rying intentions is not, however, fatal to the enterprise of original inten-
tions adjudication. The difficulty is intractable only if there are multiple
and totally contradictory intentions. This could happen if, for example, a
constitutional provision was created with some constitution-makers in-
tending it to mean X and only X, while other constitution-makers in-
tended it to mean not-X and only not-X. Such contradiction is extremely
unlikely, however, because though the intentions involved are held by
different people, those intentions are associated with the adoption of
identical language. The use of the same language suggests a common
core of meaning shared by all.9 3 Any different intentions are, therefore,
likely to be overlapping not contradictory. Thus, if an ordinance prohib-
its "vehicles in the park," it is safe to assume that all of the enactors
intended it apply to ordinary automobiles. 94 Similarly, in a constitu-
tional context, probably all of the enactors of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments understood that incarceration would be a deprivation of lib-
erty requiring due process of law. The differences in intention will arise
in cases beyond the obvious situations suggested by the language, as that
language was ordinarily used and understood. Where there is disagree-
ment it will be with respect to the outer reach or scope of the rule. To
use the terminology of some modern philosophers of language, these dif-
ferences will be attributable to the vagueness, not the ambiguity, of the
words adopted.95
Originally, I stated the problem in this section to be the combination
93 See H. HART, supra note 25, at 121-26; Perry, supra note 15, at 601.
94 See H. HART, supra note 25, at 125; Brest, supra note 6, at 209-13.
95 See W. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECr 125-34 (1960); Young, Equivocation in the Making of
Agreements, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 619, 626-32, 646-47 (1964). A similar point specifically relating to
constitutional interpretation is made in Maltz, Appeal, supra note 11, at 30-31.
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of disparate intentions into one authoritative intention of the group with
authority to make law. But, given the kind of differences likely to occur,
we should be able to accumulate enough identical intentions to compose
an authoritative lawmaker. By discerning the language's central para-
digm, we can define an area of application that was intended by virtually
all the relevant individuals who together constitute the lawmaker. As we
move out from this core idea to somewhat less obvious applications, we
can expect to find fewer individuals who intend the law to extend so far.
Still, as long as it is probable that a necessary law-making majority
shared a particular understanding it will be appropriate to so interpret
the provision. This approach, therefore, requires the judge to ask
whether the challenged action falls within a meaning intended by an au-
thoritative lawmaker. Idiosyncratic meanings held by individuals within
the majority (or by individual law-making bodies) falling outside that
shared, core intention will not have the force of law because they lack
such an authoritative source. They may be ignored for the same reasons
that we ignore the intentions of the dissenters. 96
This argument assumes that individuals do not employ the same
words to mean entirely opposite things, especially in circumstances
where they discuss and debate the meaning of those words before adopt-
ing them. Therefore, there will almost always be some core meaning that
reflects the intentions of the constitution-makers. This is true even when
there is no controlling intention with respect to other, fringe meanings.
It is conceivable that a legislative majority could adopt a measure
even though no lawmaking majority shared an intention regarding its
application to any case. This would occur when no central, uncontrover-
sial core of meaning existed. This would be true, for example, if some
enactors thought the term "natural born citizen" in Article II's presiden-
tial qualifications referred to place of birth while others thought it re-
ferred to those not born by Caesarean section,97 and there was no
majority for either view. In such a case, it would not be possible to accu-
mulate enough identical intentions to arrive at one authoritative law-
making intention. Without such an intention, the provision could not
make law. Functionally, it would be a case of "intentionless meaning"
and should have no more claim to our allegiance than a document "put
together by a tribe of monkeys with quills."98 It would be legal gibber-
ish. As the very example shows, however, it is hard to believe such to-
tally contradictory intentions are common.99 More often shared
96 See Perry, supra note 15, at 601.
97 See J. ELY, supra note 43, at 13.
98 Michaels, supra note 21, at 774.
99 In addition to ambiguity (different meanings at the core) and vagueness (different meanings at
the fringe), there is a third possible arrangement of intentions. This third possibility would arise if
there were two different but related paradigm cases. While this seems more likely than ambiguity, it
makes little difference to the analysis suggested here. If intentions as to coverage overlap, we can
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intentions may be narrow and the area of possible but unintended mean-
ings consequently broad. Then the effect of the constitutional rule would
be similarly restricted. In the areas of application where no law-making
majority agreement exists, there would be no relevant constitutional
rule.100
Because, as outlined, the task of ascertaining and summing individ-
ual and institutional intentions appears extraordinarily difficult, it is use-
ful to recall the very limited questions about intention that a judge must
answer in constitutional adjudication. It is true that the determination of
a shared intention calls for judgments about the psychological states of
people long dead, but it will rarely be necessary to investigate these
things directly. The concern is simply which of two contesting interpre-
tations is more likely consistent with the original intention. The answer
will often be presumptively clear from the language the constitution-
makers chose. Beyond that, it will be enough in most cases to learn what
people, at the time, generally meant when they used certain language and
what people involved in the process of enactment thought was at issue.
A presumption that the majority adopting a measure shared that inten-
tion is reasonable unless evidence to the contrary is adduced.101
In fact, a great deal of information is available on these matters, as
anyone who has researched such questions will attest. Numerous
sources, both general and particular, are available. Legislative debates,
committee reports, contemporary commentary, preliminary votes, earlier
and subsequent statements of the participants, biographies, and other leg-
islation can all be examined. Separate inquiries into the beliefs of each
actor will almost always be unnecessary. Such research often turns up
information that will allow us to speak with some assurance about the
things that were probably within the shared core meaning and what
could not have been part of those necessary shared intentions. 102
There will, of course, be instances of relative uncertainty, but, for
the reasons already stated, such uncertainty does not undermine the pro-
still look for a majority intention on the particular action at issue. If one cannot be found, then no
authoritative constitutional rule would exist.
100 The absence of an applicable express rule does not necessarily render the result of adjudication
indeterminate. See infra text accompanying notes 124-30.
Ronald Dworkin doubts whether "an intention" can be held even by individual legislators. He
asks whether the intended meaning should be what the legislator hoped for or what he expected
would be followed. He notes, for example, the case where a legislator assents, for political reasons,
to legislation he dislikes. In that case, the legislator might hope for a narrow construction while
expecting a broad one. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 322-24. Of course, this problem only
arises by focusing on this one artificial and idiosyncratic case. For most legislators hopes and expec-
tations will coincide. Ordinarily, these sincere legislators will be sufficiently numerous to make an
authoritative lawmaker and Dworkin's hypocrite may be disregarded. Even where that is not the
case, it does not distort the notion of legislative intention to say that a legislator who adopts a
measure he expects to have a certain effect intends those effects to eventuate.
101 See Dickerson, supra note 24, at 210-11.
102 See Landis, supra note 30, at 888-89; Comment, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
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ject. It is sufficient for a judge, in light of the evidence, to decide whether
it is more probable than not that a particular act was within the shared
area of agreement. In making that judgment, it is unimportant that we
do not know the eccentric and unexpressed intentions of some of the
constitution-makers. What we do know will usually be sufficient to show
that such views were not widely enough held to change our conclusions
about the scope of the constitutional provision intended by an enacting
majority.
2. The Problem of Historical Understanding. -Another argument
against original intentions adjudication suggests that it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to understand intentions formed and expressed a very
long time ago.10 3 As with the multiple intentions problem, this argument
is in some ways a restatement of the more extreme claim discussed
above-that communication of an intended meaning through language is
inherently impossible. This claim is based on a "fatal" gap between the
moment of expression and the moment of understanding. But all inter-
pretation-contemporary as well as ancient-is historical in this sense.
And, if it is conceded that some immediate communication is possible,
then the difficulty is not different in kind simply because the time be-
tween speaking and listening or writing and reading is changed from
minutes or days to decades or centuries.104
Of course, because our capacity to learn intentions is to some degree
a function of what we know about the speaker and about the circum-
stances in which he speaks, the process of discovering the intention be-
hind language becomes more difficult as the intervening period becomes
longer.105 In constitutional adjudication, the task of seeking the original
intentions involves an attempt to recreate the perspectives of the consti-
Fourteenth Amendment The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 142, 147-48 (1984) (positing an
"impressionistic majority model" of original intentions.)
This is not to deny that the written records of the proceedings which must be considered are
often unreliable. James Hutson has recently presented evidence that many of the standard sources
consulted in connection with the adoption of the Constitution are seriously suspect. See Hutson,
The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record 65 TEX. L. REv. 1
(1980). But this does not mean that the records, read intelligently, carefully, and often skeptically
provide no useful information on the original intentions. Indeed, the admirable work of scholars like
Hutson enable an increasingly sensitive and accurate evaluation of those records. See, eg., J. HUT-
SON, SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787
(1987).
103 See Brennan, supra note 60, at 435; Powell, supra note 16, at 673-74; Tushnet, Following the
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 793-
804 (1983).
104 See E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 256 ("For it is merely arbitrary ... to hold that a meaning
fifty years old is ontologically alien while one three years or three minutes old is not."); E. HIRSCH,
THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION 27 (1976) (noting the similarity of the "historical" and "psychologi-
cal" versions of hermeneutical skepticism.)
105 See E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 44; C. MILLER, supra note 16, at 156-58; Nickel, Uneasiness
About Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 482-83 (1985).
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tution-makers-their values, their needs, and even what we would con-
sider their misconceptions. Our world is drastically different from theirs.
Both the way we use language and the things we use language about have
changed substantially. These differences, some critics suggest, render im-
probable any claim that we can capture those intentions.106
The very breadth of this claim makes it implausible. It-is essentially
an attack on the possibility and validity of historical investigation. While
some students of history deny the possibility of objectively correct histor-
ical conclusions,10 7 the contrary view is also widely and firmly held. 10 8
Indeed, the force of the latter position is strengthened by the fact that
history is a well-established discipline to which thousands of sensible
people have devoted and continue to devote their energy and intelligence.
These scholars proceed on the assumption that, with varying degrees of
effort, it is possible to ascertain and adopt the viewpoint of another per-
son, even if that other person is remote in place, culture or time.
This understanding is accomplished by consciously suppressing our
contemporary preconceptions and values, and attempting to reconstruct
those of our subject. 10 9 We need not know everything about that other
consciousness, only those aspects which illumine the intended meaning
106 See Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 87, 92 (1984); Peller, supra note 50, at 1173-74. But see Gordon, Historicism in Legal Schol-
arship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1020 (1981).
107 See C. BECKER, DETACHMENT AND THE WRITING OF HISTORY: ESSAYS AND LETTERS OF
CARL L. BECKER 54-57 (1958); C. NORRIS, supra note 53, at 78. Hayden White, who might be
associated with this position, does not appear to be as much concerned with historical judgments on
the occurrence of discrete events as with the inevitable subjectivity of any attempt at historical narra-
tive. See H. WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE 55-57, 67, 107 (1978); White, The Politics of Historical
Interpretation: Discipline and De-Sublimation in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 119, 129 (W.
Mitchell ed. 1983).
108 See R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 217-28 (1946); Nelson, History and Neutrality
in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1246-49 (1986). This is no less true with
respect to intellectual history. J.G.A. Pocock emphasizes the historian's primary concern "with
what eigentlich [actually] happened or-the special form which this takes in the history of thought-
what eigentlich [actually] was meant." J. POCOCK, supra note 57, at 6.
109 Some scholars, of course, regard such observations-and indeed, the whole enterprise of
intellectual history-as unverifiable "impressionistic" history and hold that we can never know
how other people think or thought. That seems to me to violate common sense (in the twenti-
eth-century signification of those words, not in the eighteenth), for we think in the patterns of
others as a matter of daily routine. College students, for example, frequently encounter profes-
sors who teach from points of view that the students do not share and when that happens,
students in pursuit of grades are usually able and willing to write the essays and give the an-
swers that the teacher wants to hear. What is involved is this: thinking takes place in symbolic
codes or languages, and we can learn to think in languages that are not native to us, whether
these be Latin, music, mathematics, legalese, or eighteenth-century English.
F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
x-xi (1985). Cf. S. FISH, supra note 54, at 314-15. Hirsch puts the point concisely: "It is within the
capacity of every individual to imagine himself other than he is, to realize in himself another human
or cultural possibility." E. HIRSCH, supra note 104, at 47. A useful discussion of the possibilities
and limits of historical understanding is found in A. DANTo, NARRATION AND KNOWLEDGE 285-
97, 334-41 (1985).
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of a particular utterance.110 Of course, we can never identify completely
with another person but this is true of contemporary as well as historical
interpretation. Nonetheless, attempts to do so have yielded results that
provisionally, at least, we have found both satisfactory and useful."'
Attempts to discover the intentions behind historical acts and ex-
pressions, therefore, do not seem inherently fruitless. And, among his-
torical questions, those concerning the drafting and ratification of the
United States Constitution are by no means the hardest. The problems
may be significant but they are not insurmountable. This is not an in-
quiry into the intentions of the lawmakers of ancient Sumeria. While we
may be separated from our predecessors in many ways, we also have
many things in common.1 2 Not the least of these is the use of the same,
if considerably altered, language.1 13 Moreover, the enactors and their
contemporaries left us a great deal of written information about the
problems with which they were concerned and the solutions they would
have found acceptable or unacceptable. We are similar enough to the
people of those times that we can intelligently investigate how things ap-
peared to them and what they thought they were doing when they cre-
ated constitutional rules now at issue.
Finally, as I noted when considering the problem of multiple inten-
tions, original intentions adjudication only calls for decisions regarding
which of two proposed interpretations is more likely to be consistent with
those original intentions. In most cases, it should be possible to recap-
ture enough of the past to make that choice.
3. The Probabilities in Balance. -The discussion thus far has omit-
ted one significant possibility. A judge, after considering the evidence of
the relevant intentions, could decide that neither of the contesting pro-
positions about the original intention is more likely than the other-that
is, he might conclude that the evidence exactly balances. 114 In such
cases, we might have a supplemental rule that, for example, places the
burden of proof on the party claiming that constitutional rules have been
110 See E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 242-43.
111 See id. at 256-57; J. PococK, supra note 57, at 37-38; Michaels, Is There a Politics of Interpre-
tation? in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 335, 340 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983).
112 Put another way, "the paradigm-structure ha[s] remained sufficiently stable over the interven-
ing centuries for this to be possible." J. PococK, supra note 57, at 29-30. See Graftf, supra note 67,
at 410; E. HiRSCH, supra note 104, at 39. But see, eg., Tushnet, supra note 103, at 799-800.
113 We are [able to understand what a literary work means] because an immense store of cumu-
lative evidence provides assurance that the authors of literary texts belonged to the linguistic
community into which we were later born, and so shared our skill, and the consensual regulari-
ties on which that skill depends, with some divergencies-which we have a variety of clues for
detecting-which are the result both of the slow change of communal regularities in time and of
the limited innovations which can be introduced by the individual author.
Abrams, supra note 73, at 587.
114 See Powell, supra note 16, at 688-89.
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violated. 115 But unless such a rule itself could be inferred from the origi-
nal intentions of the enactors, this would result in cases being decided on
grounds independent of the original intentions. There may exist, there-
fore, certain cases in which original intentions adjudication will yield no
answer.
In practice, however, these "ties" will be exceedingly rare. 16 This is
because the available information about the creators of the constitutional
rules is so plentiful. Given the usual denseness of the historical record, a
competent person is unlikely to come across many cases where the evi-
dence that the original intentions did and the evidence that it did not
extend to the act in question is precisely equal. 117 The strength of an
interpreter's convictions may depend on the relative strength of the two
cases, but he will almost always be able to say that one is better than the
other.
It may be objected, however, that one kind of tie may be quite com-
mon. That is in a case where no evidence exists either way concerning
whether a given act was or was not within the intended scope of a consti-
tutional provision-a 0-0 tie. Some commentators argue that such cases
are common because most actions challenged as unconstitutional were
unimagined by the enactors, at least in the particular circumstances in
which they now occur. 18 Today, the objects of constitutional litigation
are, or relate to, scientific and technological assumptions, political prac-
tices, economic relationships, and social arrangements of which the enac-
tors were ignorant.' 19
It does not follow, however, that because the enactors did not know
of the existence of a specific act or practice that they, therefore, had no
intention concerning it in creating a constitutional provision. Those in-
tentions often related to categories of action rather than to particular
people or instances of conduct.' 20 Indeed, this is the ordinary assump-
tion we make about a legislator's intent. For example, the enactor of a
rule setting the speed limit at 55 miles per hour knows nothing about the
particular vehicles or people who might violate the rule, but we have
little difficulty agreeing that he really intended to punish them. "Thus it
is possible," E.D. Hirsch notes, "to will an et cetera without in the least
115 See, e.g., Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935) (heavy burden of
proof rests on party claiming unconstitutionality of statutes); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419, 436 (1827) (same).
116 I have borrowed this term as well as the general character of the response from R. DWORKIN,
supra note 61, at 285-87 (1977); Dworkin, No Right Answer, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 30 (1978),
although he uses it in a very different argument.
117 See Toulmin, supra note 81, at 107.
118 See Brest, supra note 6, at 220-21; Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 1242.
119 See Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 1242 ("for example, it is absurd to try to find the Framers'
intent concerning the regulation of the broadcast media ....").
120 See Bennett, supra note 16, at 464; Dickerson, supra note 24, at 215; McAffee, supra note 81,
at 289-90.
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being aware of all these individual members that belong to it."121 To fail
to apply a rule that was intended to cover a category of acts to an in-
stance falling within that category would, itself, be unfaithful to the origi-
nal intentions.
Therefore, nothing more than consulting the original intentions is
required to conclude, for example, that the ban on "cruel and unusual
punishment" prohibits the use of an electric as well as a manual thumb-
screw. A similar application of original intent is involved in bringing the
use of electronic eavesdropping devices within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment rule regulating "searches." 122 The latter determination will
be controversial only to the extent we suspect that the enactors may have
intended the relevant category to have a different definition. This is, it-
self, a question of intention and can be investigated in just the same way
as any other such question: Based on the evidence available, was the
scope of the category intended to include the particular thing at issue?123
Nevertheless, some things may fall outside the categories established
by the constitution-makers only because they are so different from those
the enactors knew about. In such cases, we cannot assume they made
any provision for them at all. 124 But do such cases really result in a 0-0
tie with original intentions adjudication providing no solution? I believe
the Constitution, as intended by its creators, provides a decision on con-
stitutionality for every possible action no matter how different it is from
the things and circumstances the constitution-makers had in mind. Im-
plicit in the Constitution are "back-up rules" which cover all things not
provided for in the explicit rules. It must be stressed these back-up rules
are not new constructs created in order to make original intentions adju-
121 See E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 49. Hirsch notes the particular importance of this capability
with respect to legal interpretation. See id. at 124-25. In a later article he makes clear that this, in
no way, breaks the critical link to the original intention. See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 214-15, 218-
19.
122 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). This kind of determination is some-
times described as an application of a constitutional rule to "analogous" cases. See Grano, supra
note 11, at 61-75.
123 Some writers have called this a question of whether the constitution-makers held "abstract" as
opposed to "concrete" intentions. See Dworkin, supra note 82, at 490-91; Dworkin, Law as Interpre-
tation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 527, 547 (1982); Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L.
REv. 489, 506-07 (1985). As the method outlined in the text indicates, I do not think it is ever
necessary to make this choice in generaL Rather, the appropriate level of abstraction will emerge in
the course of determining the reach of the original intentions with respect to particular challenged
acts. The extreme form of the argument, based on a very broad intention, is that the constitution-
makers intended that their own intentions should not govern decisions of individual cases. This is
discussed infra in Section IV.
124 Richard Epstein thinks acceptance of a categorical approach is inconsistent with a finding that
new things cannot be subsumed in the existing provisions by "principled adjudication." See R.
EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 28-29. But this seems to me no more than a historical question about the
scope of the categories created. For the reasons suggested in the text, it is not unreasonable to
believe that the enactors left some things to be decided according to the allocation of governmental
power adopted and not by express constitutional rules.
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dication feasible.125 Rather, they are legitimate inferences from the en-
actment of the constitutional text. They are an inherent part of what the
constitution-makers did when they created the Constitution.
These back-up rules are a necessary consequence of the federal sys-
tem of granted and residual powers established by the Constitution. The
Constitution created a national government against a background of pre-
existing states. That government exists only by virtue of the enactment
of the Constitution. Therefore, we must find in the Constitution all of its
features and all of its powers. There is nowhere else to look. Conse-
quently, any action of the federal government not traceable to the enu-
merated institutions and powers is an exercise of power not granted to it
and is contrary to the Constitution. Any truly new thing done by the
federal government is unauthorized and therefore void.1 26
On the other hand, the United States Constitution was enacted on
the assumption that the existing states would continue to exist. The
states necessarily derived their governmental institutions and powers
from sources outside the new Constitution. Therefore, the absence of a
reference to a state power is not equivalent to a lack of authorization.
The Constitution declares itself to be and was, no doubt, intended to be
supreme over the states, but only insofar as it specifically limited state
powers. Any truly new thing done by a state must be outside of those
prohibitions, and must, therefore, be constitutional. 127
This conclusion is itself an interpretation of the Constitution. It is,
therefore, subject to rebuttal by persuasive historical evidence to the con-
trary. The case for it, however, is very strong. The constitution-makers
differed among themselves about the appropriate scope of the powers of
the new national government, but there is no serious evidence that these
powers (whatever their extent) were not entirely granted by the new con-
125 Compare Dworkin, supra note 82, at 487.
126 Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936). See Grano, supra note 11, at 4. With respect
to the federal government, the Constitution operates as a complete grant of power, not as a mere
limitation. See In re Appeal of Norwalk St. Ry., 69 Conn. 576, 587, 37 A. 1080, 1083 (1897).
127 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248-49 (1833) (Constitution essentially a defini-
tion of federal, not state powers); Maltz, Appeal, supra note 11, at 12. Of course, a state constitution
might define a grant of powers for the state government in the same way the United States Constitu-
tion does for the federal government. See In re Appeal of Norwalk St. Ry., 69 Conn. 576, 591-93, 37
A. 1080, 1085 (1897) (state constitution an exclusive grant of power not a limitation of pre-exiting
powers). I understand that the Supreme Court's construction of the grants of power to the federal
government, especially that regulating commerce, have vastly expanded the scope of national au-
thority and substantially abridged the powers of the states. See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 178-79, 237-38 (1963); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 232-44 (1978). Whether this is faithful to the original intentions is highly doubt-
ful. But, as I stated at the outset, I am not concerned here with reconciling original intentions
adjudication with the actual case law. And, in any event, even such judicial developments are not
necessarily inconsistent with the point in text, since, rightly or wrongly, they assimilate the new
national powers upheld to the powers granted in the text. Similarly, restrictions on state power are
traced to an implicit withdrawal of such powers in the Constitution.
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stitution or that state power was altered except insofar as affirmatively
limited by the Constitution. 12 8 The Tenth Amendment makes this ex-
plicit. The Civil War amendments significantly altered the constitutional
allocation of national and state powers by enlarging federal legislative
authority and especially by placing new and broad limits on state power.
But it did not alter the underlying scheme of granted and residuary pow-
ers. 129 Debate about power in the federal system, therefore, must turn on
what the Constitution gave to the federal government and what it took
away from the States. So long as that is true, there is an answer to the
validity of every new thing. There are no omitted cases. 130
My conclusion, therefore, is that original intentions adjudication, as
defined and elaborated here, is not impossible. The implications of this
response, however, should not be exaggerated. Adherence to the original
intentions is neither theoretically impossible nor so practically difficult
that attempts at it are futile. This is not to say that it will always be an
obvious or easy technique. Sometimes it will be easy, but in many cases
it will require an intense, thorough, and sensitive assimilation of much
historical information. 13 1
128 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) quoting Baltimore & Ohio R. v. Baugh,
149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting); THE FEDERALIST No. 39 at 245 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961); R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 65-66 (1987) (surveying
statements in the Philadelphia and ratifying conventions on the effect of enumeration of federal
powers); H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 50-54 (1961) (arguing
that "[n]ational action has thus always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be
justified by some necessity .... "). See generally Zuckert, Federalism and the Founding: Toward a
Reinterpretation of the Constitutional Convention, 48 REv. POL. 166 (1986). Recent scholarship has
also persuasively argued that Madison, often thought to represent an extreme nationalist position at
the convention, held a consistently firm view that the sphere of substantive federal power should be
strictly limited. Banning, The Practicable Sphere of a Republic: James Madison, the Constitutional
Convention, and the Emergence ofRevolutionary Federalism in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTrruTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENITY 162, 169-74 (R. Beeman, S. Botein &
E. Carter eds. 1987); Banning, The Hamiltonian Madison: A Reconsideration, 92 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIG. 3 (1984).
129 See Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SuP. Cr.
REv. 39, 47-50.
130 1, thus, do not find very meaningful Michael Perry's distinction between the exercise of judi-
cial powers that are contra-constitutional (in conflict with the constitutional text) and those that are
merely extra-constitutional (going beyond the constitutional text). As originally intended, the text
forbids both extra-constitutional exercises of federal power and extra-constitutional restrictions on
the states. Cf. M. PERRY, supra note 5, at ix; Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers. Non-
Interpretive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 447, 457-58 (1983). Perry has subsequently
recognized this possibility. See Perry, Judicial Activism, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 73 (1984).
131 For an interesting example and discussion of the difficulties of original intentions adjudication
in the context of state constitutional law, see Weisbrod, On Evidences and Intentions: "The More
Proof The More Doubt", 18 CONN. L. REv. 803 (1986). See also Hutson, supra note 102 (emphasiz-
ing the difficulties in assessing the accuracy of the records associated with the adoption of the
Constitution).
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Such an examination may not always yield certain conclusions, but
that uncertainty does not make original intentions adjudication unwork-
able. The suggestion of unworkability stems from the implicit but erro-
neous assumption that because the results of original intentions
adjudication are not completely certain, they must be completely indeter-
minate. 132 This is a non-sequitur. 133 The good faith application of origi-
nal intentions will resolve many cases in ways which are relatively free
from doubt. 134 Moreover, this methodology contemplates a continuing
process of investigation in case after case by honest and intelligent judges
looking at the same or increasing amounts of evidence and who share the
same notion of the nature of their task. In a context requiring reasoned
opinions and permitting criticism and debate from within and without,
such a process is likely to lead toward increased agreement on questions
of constitutional interpretation. 135 In particular, original intentions adju-
dication will lead to rules that are as stable, objective, and impersonal as
human beings can manage when dealing with a source which can be re-
garded as authoritative. 136  Original intentions adjudication may not
achieve these goals perfectly, but to conclude that it is, therefore, useless
"is like saying that as a perfectly aseptic environment is impossible, one
132 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 1248 ("[Tlhe search for determinacy is misguided,
because constitutional cases arise only when the meaning of the Constitution is unclear and there is
no determinate solution to the constitutional questions.").
133 See Graff, supra note 67, at 410; Grey, supra note 63, at 16-17 ("complexity and controversy
do not add up to ineffability.").
134 See Schauer, supra note 69, at 422-23, 436-37; supra note 78 and accompanying text. With
respect to the analogous question of the certainty of language in light of some uncertain applications,
Frederick Schauer gives the following example: "The existence of potentially or actually vague ap-
plications of language no more compels a conclusion that language is useless than the existence of a
debatably bald man renders useless the observation that Yul Brynner is clearly bald and Ronald
Reagan is clearly not ...." Id. at 423. Cf. Epstein, The Pltfalls ofInterpretivism, 7 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 101, 103 (1984):
The community of readers may understand what "bald" means, and yet will have genuine
difficulty at the margins in deciding whether Richard A. Posner is bald. (It's close.) But that
doesn't mean that the term itself is subject to the kind of inscrutable philosophical difficulty
which renders it worthless for most of man or womankind.
135 See Toulmin, supra note 81, at 107. Stanley Fish agrees that members of a common interpre-
tative community will inevitably come to an agreement on the one thing that words mean, but "that
one thing is not always the same." S. FISH, supra note 54, at 275. By this he means that the
governing assumptions of every interpretive community are subject to change. For reasons discussed
in the text, for such a change to undermine the possibility of agreement over time on a stable, correct
interpretation would require that the change be so fundamental as to preclude the process of a
conscious reference to the interpretive presuppositions of a different period.
136 See infra text accompanying notes 303-04. It is possible, of course, to establish rules of adjudi-
cation that are objective in the sense that they eliminate any factors which depend on the personal
tastes and values of the adjudicator. "[D]ecisionmaldng... may be conceived as 'objective' without
necessarily being obedient to authority." Bennett, supra note 44, at 475. This kind of objectivity can
be achieved with a roulette wheel. Original intentions adjudication is premised on a requirement
that judicial power be subordinated to a legitimate source of law-making power. See supra text
accompanying notes 26-33.
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might as well conduct surgery in a sewer." 137 When honestly applied,
original intentions adjudication seems to reduce the influence of the per-
sonal and idiosyncratic aspects of a judge's personality or ideology more
than do alternative theories that rely on il-defined standards of one kind
or another. 138 Such rule-governed adjudication may or may not be ap-
pealing, 139 but, for the reasons suggested, it is possible.
IV. SECOND OBJECTION: IT'S SELF-CONTRADICTORY
The second principal objection to original intentions adjudication is
that the enactors themselves did not want their intentions to govern judi-
cial exposition on the lawfulness of certain governmental action. Propo-
nents of this argument suggest that the constitution-makers intended
judges to look elsewhere for guides to decision and (depending on the
proponent) wanted judges to possess varying degrees of discretion.1 40
One response to this objection is that it is largely irrelevant. It is not
illogical to argue that judges should restrict themselves to the original
intentions of the constitution-makers even if the constitution-makers
themselves thought otherwise. As I will argue in the next section, in the
final analysis, a choice of approaches to constitutional adjudication nec-
essarily rests on non-legal considerations as to the best way to structure
and operate a government and legal system. 141 A good case can be made
that the best arrangement demands subordination of government actions
to a historical, impersonal set of rules, even if those rules were created by
people who did not share our judgment about the utility of rule-following
in general. 142
The objection, therefore, presupposes the propriety of adhering to
the original intentions at least as strongly as the model of adjudication I
have outlined 143 since (adopting the useful distinction employed by Paul
Brest) it assumes submission to both the substantive and interpretive in-
tentions of the enactors. 144 That is, the claimed contradiction only
emerges if all the following propositions hold true: 1) We are bound in
137 C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 30 (1973) (attributed to Robert Solow). I
am indebted to Carol Weisbrod for this reference. See also C. ALTIERI, supra note 26, at 226-28;
Searle, supra note 53, at 78-79.
138 See J. ELY, supra note 43, at 43-72. See generally Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
139 See infra text accompanying notes 273-331.
140 See R. DwoRmiN, supra note 116, at 131-49; J. ELY, supra note 43, at 11-41. Thus this
objection may be a variant of the first in that it becomes impossible to limit constitutional rules to
those intended by the constitution-makers.
141 See infra discussion in Section V.
142 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 497; Maltz, Appeal, supra note 11, at 28.
143 See M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 71.
144 See Brest, supra note 6, at 215-16. Cf. Weisberg, Text Into Theory: A Literary Approach to the
Constitution, 20 GA. L. REv. 939, 980 (1986) (authors' theories of interpretation are appropriate
elements in interpreting those authors' writings).
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constitutional adjudication only by rules deriving from the original inten-
tions so that 2) we are bound by both the constitution-makers' interpre-
tive intentions and their substantive intentions and 3) the constitution-
makers interpretive intention requires departures from their substantive
intentions. Original intentions adjudication might be perfectly plausible
without incorporating these elements but I will take them to be essential
for the balance of this section. 145 Given this formulation of the objection,
I propose to focus on the third proposition. But that reduces to a mere
question of historical fact: What did the constitution-makers intend with
respect to the effect of their own intentions? What were the enactors'
interpretive intentions? 146 This, too, should be amenable to the ordinary
techniques of historical investigation, with the same difficulties and pos-
sibilities as questions of substantive intention. Both kinds of inquiry re-
quire judgments based on an examination of the evidence of what the
enactors said and did. 147
This claim about the original interpretive intention can be observed
in two different manifestations. The first suggests that the constitution-
makers wanted some constitutional judgments formulated on entirely ex-
tra-constitutional bases. 148 The second supposes that the enactors
wanted subsequent decisionmakers to stay within the boundaries created
by the constitution-makers, but that those boundaries were so broadly
conceived that they were not intended to require a particular result in a
particular case. 149 Both variations boil down to an assertion of historical
145 A really thoroughgoing form of original intentions adjudication might subordinate the sub-
stantive to the interpretive intentions. Then if the enactors held both a substantive intention as to
the scope of a certain provision and an interpretive intention that the substantive intention ought not
to govern a judge ought not to apply that substantive intention. But such a version of original
intentions adjudication is harder to reconcile with the non-legal justifications discussed infra in Sec-
tion V. I, therefore, deal with the objection by questioning the factual premise about the enactors'
interpretive intentions.
146 See M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 70-71; Tushnet, supra note 103, at 791.
147 Such referential interpretation remains historically bounded and has a right to be consid-
ered historically correct whenever the intention-to-refer has dominated historically over the
literal contents of mind, and therefore has made those literal contents provisional and allegori-
cal.
Hirsch, Past Intentions and Present Meanings, 33 ESSAYS IN CRrrIcIsM 79, 96 (1983).
148 See infra text accompanying notes 164-209 discussing the arguments of John Hart Ely. Ely's
further argument in favor of applying standards that reinforce representative government seems to
be based, at least in part, on the goodness of democratic decisionmaking, independent of its endorse-
ment by the Constitution. See Kay, Book Review, 13 CoNN. L. REV. 203 (1980).
149 The distinction between "abstract" and "concrete" intentions is made in Dworkin, supra note
123, at 547; Dworkin, supra note 82, at 488-97. See also Richards, supra note 123, at 507-09. It is
true, as Dworkin points out, that the enactors probably held both types of intentions and there is no
logical objection to later political actors basing their decisions on one or the other without referring
to interpretive intentions in making that choice. See supra text ccompanying note 144; Dworkin,
supra note 82, at 490-95. But at this point we have presumed the controlling relevance of the inter-
pretive intentions and those intentions will tell us whether the abstract or concrete substantive inten-
tions were intended to govern. It is implausible to suppose that the constitution-makers intended a
rule to cover only a narrow category of actions they had in mind and that they also intended judges
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fact-that the constitution-makers did not intend to set down binding
rules of decision for a substantial number of constitutional cases, contem-
plating instead decisions according to standards not of their own
making.150
Unfortunately, little serious historical research has focused on the
question of interpretive intentions. Many commentators who have ar-
gued that the enactors intended reference to external and independent
sources of decision have merely asserted that the framers "must have"
held this kind of intention.1 51 What research has been done on the point
is far from conclusive. Moreover, it is possible that the enactors had
different interpretive intentions for different provisions.' 52 Finally, like
the questions of substantive intent already discussed, any answer will
have to be based on a balancing of probabilities.
I have not researched this issue sufficiently to entitle me to venture a
firm opinion on this question. My conclusion is, therefore, provisional.
Based on my general understanding of the evidence, however, I think it is
difficult to ascribe to the enactors an intention not to restrict constitu-
tional adjudication to the rules of the written Constitution in the senses
they understood them.
One critical fact suggests a presumption that the constitution-mak-
ers of 1787-89 would not favor a legal regime in which the judges con-
sulted extra-constitutional factors in reviewing the validity of acts of the
government. It is well known that the enactors were suspicious of gov-
ernmental power.15 3 Their remedy to minimize the risks of governmen-
tal abuse was the creation of explicit rules for exercising public power.1 54
Those rules were to emanate from a source superior to the governmental
to reach other related actions outside that category. Of course, the initial decision to follow the
original interpretive intentions with respect to this question must be defended on non-legal criteria.
See Dworkin, supra note 82, at 498; infra text accompanying notes 296-300.
150 This is true only on the assumption, discussed supra note 149, that the original interpretive
intention should govern. Otherwise the objection is not about the incoherence of original intentions
adjudication, but about its wisdom. That objection is discussed in Section V.
151 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 1243; Leedes, A Critique of Illegitimate Non-Inter-
pretism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 533, 547 (1983); Richards, supra note 123, at 507-09; Schlag, supra
note 12, at 300-02. This argument is often accompanied by a citation to Chief Justice Marshall's
famous remarks in McCulloch v. Maryland that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding .... 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
152 One variation of original intentions adjudication would hold that the interpretative intent of
only the 1787 enactors was controlling. Under this view the lawmakers of the amendments would be
acting under delegated power granting only the authority to make rules which would be interpreted
and applied in a way approved by the delegators. For the purposes of this essay it is unnecessary to
consider in detail the various forms which original intentions adjudication might take. See Maltz,
Appeal, supra note 11, at 27.
153 See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 255-56 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); G. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 135, 410-11 (1969); Berger, Lawyering m Phi-
losophizing: Facts or Fancies, 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 171, 211-14 (1984).
154 The existence of a legal document means that someone has taken the trouble to put the
sense of some agreement or set of instructions in writing. The normal point of doing this-and
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officials to be controlled. 155 It would be most peculiar if the enactors
created these rules with an intention that they were not to be employed in
exercising that control. It is unlikely they would have debated, argued,
planned, and denounced the particular rules proposed if they believed
they could not understand the effect of the rules, or that their under-
standing of the rules would not define the limits of legitimate governmen-
tal authority.1 56
This conclusion is confirmed by the constitution-makers insistence
on a written constitution. The enactors understood that to write down
the constitutional rules was to fix them-a result impossible if, in the
future, the rules could be altered by referring to changing factors outside
the Constitution itself.157 Similarly, there would be no reason to fix the
rules if the words used could be applied in any sense they might bear-
that is, without reference to the sense in which the enactors employed
them. 158
Those fixed rules, moreover, had for the enactors a peculiar potency
because they expressed the "original and supreme" will of the people.15 9
It was universally understood that the approval of the people was the
political sanction which gave the Constitution its force. Of course, to the
extent that the Constitution was law only because it proceeded from the
people or their appropriate surrogates, it followed that the content of the
legal rule must be what "the people" intended. 16° This idea that the
here legal practice builds on presuppositions taken from ordinary life in a literate culture-is to
make relatively definite and explicit what otherwise would be relatively indefinite and tacit.
Grey, supra note 63, at 14.
155 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
156 One historian has described the ratification debates as "a dispute between contending social
interests over a question no less vital than the future of republican government in America and the
world." Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1795, 31 WM. &
MARY Q. 167, 167 (1974).
157 See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 291.
158 Almost any word sequence can, under the conventions of language, legitimately represent
more than one complex of meaning. A word sequence means nothing in particular until some-
body either means something by it or understands something from it .... One proof that the
conventions of language can sponsor different meanings from the same sequence of words re-
sides in the fact that interpreters can and do disagree. When these disagreements occur, how
are they to be resolved? Under the theory of semantic autonomy they cannot be resolved, since
the meaning is not what the author meant, but "what the poem means to different sensitive
readers."
E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 4 (quoting T. S. Eliot).
159 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
160 The theme that only the approval of the people would ultimately sanction the Constitution is
ubiquitous in the discussions at the time of the Constitution's ratification. James Wilson, a member
of the Philadelphia Convention, an early Justice of the Supreme Court, and one of the first national
authorities on constitutional law, wrote:
From [the people's] authority the Constitution originates: for their safety and felicity it is estab-
lished: in their hands it is as clay in the hands of the potter: they have the right to mould, to
preserve, to improve, to refine, and to finish it as they please. If so; can it be doubted, that they
have the right likewise to change it?
Wilson, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 304 (McCloskey ed. 1967); see THE
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Constitution is the fixed command of the sovereign people is hard to rec-
oncile with the suggestion that the constitution-makers foresaw as proper
any interpretation not based on their original intentions. 161
Two kinds of arguments have been made that, regardless of this
guiding attitude, the constitution-makers must have contemplated an
ongoing redefinition of the rules. The first, best argued by John Hart
Ely, relies on certain provisions of the constitutional text that he claims
are most plausibly understood as "an invitation to look beyond their four
corners." 162 The second, suggested in a recent article by H. Jefferson
Powell, 163 is premised on the enactors' general understanding of statu-
tory construction, a process that he asserts did not include reference to
the intentions of legislators.
A. Open-Ended Provisions
Almost no one doubts that the constitution-makers wanted their in-
tentions for the constitutional rules to govern at least some cases. When
the Constitution sets forth specific structural details of government, most
people agree that the enactors intended their express intentions to gov-
ern. This would be true, for example, where the constitution requires a
minimum age for various offices, 164 or where it specifies the date on
which Congress should convene.1 65 But, it is argued, that same inference
is not as plausible when we are interpreting the non-specific "majestic
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See generally Kay, supra note
89, at 133-36. Of course the form in which the "people" convened was the somewhat imperfect one
of the ad hoc constitutional convention. See also G. WooD, supra note 153, at 89.
161 Chief Justice Marshall captured both aspects of this idea when he stated:
The exercise of this original right [of the people to establish a Constitution] is a very great
exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so estab-
lished, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme,
and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
162 J. ELY, supra note 43, at 13.
163 See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. Rav. 885 (1985).
164 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (age requirement for representative); art. I, § 3 (age requirement
for senator); art. II, § 1 (age requirement for president).
165 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4; Carter, supra note 54, at 854; Maltz, New Thoughts, supra note 11,
at 833. Of course, even these kinds of provisions could be interpreted so that they would not restrict
judges to the specific intentions they appear to embody. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 106, at 90:
Does thirty-five [referring to the age requirement for President] denote a number of revolutions
of the Earth around the Sun, or was it designed as a percentage of the average lifespan (so today
the President must be forty-five)? Or could the language conceivably denote some number of
years after puberty (so today one could be President at thirty)?
A subsequent speaker at the same symposium commented on the usefulness of such analysis:
When [Easterbrook] gave the alternate constructions of. . . "thirty-five years" ... people in the
audience laughed. The reason they laughed is they recognized that he was now engaged not in
the ordinary discourse of how we find meaning, but rather in the law professor's game of how it
is when we have a statute which says thirty-five years we can make it look obscure, thereby
demonstrating not the silliness of the founders, but of your own imagination and intelligence.
Epstein, supra note 134, at 101-02.
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generalities" 166 of the Constitution, such as freedom of speech, obligation
of contract, due process or equal protection. It is argued that the choice
of such broad terms indicates an intent not to limit the application of the
provision to the particular substantive intentions of the enactors. 167 Pro-
ponents of this argument assert that the enactors chose such language
exactly because they understood that the Constitution would have to be
applied over time in unknown circumstances and they, therefore, deter-
mined to permit decisional flexibility.1 68
The existence of broad terms in the Constitution does seem to be
good evidence of an abstract original intention or one which directs us to
values outside the Constitution. But it is mere evidence. It must be rec-
onciled with contrary evidence, including the commitment to a govern-
ment limited by pre-existing law.169 The constitution-makers may have
used broad language to express narrow, concrete intentions. 170 What ap-
pear to us to be general terms may, in fact, have been used as specific
terms of art, 17' or they may just have been inapt words chosen carelessly.
If that turns out to be the case-if that is our best judgment of the origi-
nal intentions and we, by hypothesis, are now committed to following
those intentions-we would be unjustified in ignoring them simply be-
cause the enactors were less than clear. 172 The point was best made by
Holmes when he said, "It is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts
166 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966).
167 See Dworkin, supra note 82, at 494 ("It is highly implausible that people who believe their
own opinions about what counts as equality or justice should be followed, even if these beliefs are
wrong, would use only the general language of equality and justice in framing their commands.");
Carter, supra note 54, at 864; Richards, supra note 123, at 507. For a general discussion of these
"two-clause" theories of the Constitution, see C. MILLER, supra note 16, at 162-67. These theories
are criticized in Monaghan, Perfect, supra note 11, at 361-67.
168 See supra note 151 (quotation from McCulloch v. Maryland); H. HART, supra note 25, at 124-
27; E. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 124-25; Hirsch, supra note 59, at 223.
169 See supra text accompanying notes 153-61; infra text accompanying notes 274-93 (regarding
the attitudes of the constitution-makers toward judicial power).
170 This is the conclusion of Raoul Berger about the terms of the fourteenth amendment. See
generally R. BERGER, supra note 6.
171 See id. at 20-36, 193-220 (discussing the meaning of "privileges or immunities" and "due
process"). The same phenomenon continues today. For example, English jurisprudence frequently
uses a concept called the requirement of "natural justice," which denotes only procedural rules. See
E. WADE & A. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 642-51 (10th ed. 1985).
That other constitution-makers may use such terms and be misinterpreted is illustrated by the use
and judicial interpretation of a variant of the term "natural justice" in the recently adopted Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Constitution Act, 1982, § 7. Compare P. HoGG, supra note
40, at 746-49 with Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (1985) 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536
(S.C.C.).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 24-33 and particularly the discussion of the Cernauskas
case.
The Anti-Federalists bitterly opposed the Constitution, in part, because they felt it was vague
and indefinite. See J. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 153-55 (1961). Madison's response was not
so much a defense of the virtue of generality as it was an argument that the Constitution had settled
matters remarkably well, given the inherent limitations of language-a fact, he conceded, that con-
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to say: we see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and
therefore we shall go on as before."' 73
John Hart Ely, in his enlightening and closely argued treatment of
modem judicial review, has made the most specific assertions that certain
broadly worded provisions were intended to give courts license to make
decisions according to extra-constitutional criteria. Ely focuses his argu-
ment on the ninth amendment and the privileges or immunities clause of
stituted an obstacle to achieving the founders' objectives. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, 229-31 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
In subsequent statements, participants in the constitution-making process similarly expressed a
belief that the rules created were quite clear under the circumstances. Caleb Strong, speaking at the
Massachusetts ratifying Convention, said:
Gentlemen have said, the proposed Constitution was in some places ambiguous. I wish they
would point out the particular instances of ambiguity; for my part I think the whole of it is
expressed in the plain, common language of mankind. If any parts are not so explicit as they
could be, it cannot be attributed to any design; for I believe a great majority of the men who
formed it were sincere and honest men.
3 M. FARRAND, supra note 91, at 248. Gouverneur Morris, writing in 1814, was slightly more
cautious:
That instrument was written by the fingers, which write this letter. Having rejected redundant
and equivocal terms, I believed it to be as clear as our language would permit; excepting, never-
theless, a part of what relates to the judiciary. On that subject, conflicting opinions had been
maintained with so much professional astuteness, that it became necessary to select phrases,
which expressing my own notions would not alarm others, nor shock their self-love, and to the
best of my recollection, this was the only part which passed without cavil.
Id. at 420. Earlier, Morris had written respecting article IV, § 3: "Candor obliges me to add my
belief, that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been made." Id.
at 404.
Abraham Baldwin, speaking in the House of Representatives in 1796, also agreed that certain
constitutional matters were left unclear, but in doing so showed his belief that this was more the
exception than the rule:
[S]ome subjects were left a little ambiguous and uncertain. It was a great thing to get so many
difficult subjects definitely settled at once. If they could all be agreed in, it would compact the
Government. The few that were left a little unsettled might, without great risk, be settled by
practice or by amendments in the progress of the Government .... When he reflected on the
immense difficulties and dangers of that trying occasion-the old Government prostrated, and a
chance whether a new one could be agreed in-the recollection recalled to him nothing but the
most joyful sensations that so many things had been so well settled, and the experience had
shown there was very little difficulty or danger in settling the rest.
Id. at 370. Samuel Adams seemed to sum up a prevalent attitude in the period when he insisted in
1768 that a written constitution was required so "that not a single point may be subject to the least
ambiguity." G. WooD, supra note 153, at 267 (quoting Samuel Adams); see also id. at 301-03.
With respect to the fourteenth amendment, H. Jefferson Powell, who argues that the 1787-89
constitution-maker's interpretive intent did not rely on recourse to the original intentions, see infra
text accompanying notes 222-72, concludes that the conventional view based on the original inten-
tions was well established by the time of the Civil War. Powell quotes, among other things, Charles
Sumner's remark that in case of doubt as to constitutional meaning, "we cannot err if we turn to the
framers." Powell, supra note 163, at 947. Shortly after the fourteenth amendment's adoption a
Senate Judiciary Committee Report stated: "A construction which would give the phrase ... a
meaning differing from the sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when they
adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the plain and express
language of the Constitution." S. Rep. No. 21, 42d Cong. 2d Sess. (1872), quoted in R. BERGER,
supra note 128, at 18.
173 Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (lst Cir. 1908).
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the fourteenth amendment. 174 In each case, however, other research has
indicated that the enactors may have conceived these provisions in a
much narrower sense.
1. Privileges or Immunities.-Ely reasonably concludes that the
provision of the fourteenth amendment 175 prohibiting state laws which
would "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States announces rather plainly that there is a set of entitlements that no
state is to take away."' 176 He goes on to assert, however, that this
amounts to "a delegation to future constitutional decisionmakers to pro-
tect certain rights that the document neither lists, at least not exhaus-
tively, nor even in any specific way gives directions for finding,"' 177 and
that the "invitation" to define the new rights so extended is
"frightening." 78
This is only correct if we cannot discover an intended definition of
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" which limits
judicial invention. Ely does not support his conclusion that no fixed defi-
nition was intended by citing legislative or other history in which some of
the enactors affirmatively expressed such a position. Rather, he relies on
a claim that his interpretation "fits the language," 179 and on the argu-
ment that the other, limiting interpretations based on legislative history
cannot be reconciled with parts of that history. 80
It is not clear why the language, looked at independently, is more
174 Ely makes the same kind of argument for the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. As with the two provisions discussed below, he argues that the words of the provision
are necessarily incomplete because they fail to specify which inequalities require more than mere
rational justification. Moreover, almost any objection to any statute may be recast as one to unequal
treatment. See J. ELY, supra note 43, at 30-32. But he does not show how these features of the
amendment were intended to open the door to judicial formulation of new constitutional rules.
Raoul Berger's evidence concerning the privileges or immunities Clause also points to a restricted
scope for the Equal Protection Clause, limiting it to inequalities covering a defined set of rights. See
infra text accompanying notes 176-87. A different but still limited and pre-defined original under-
standing has been suggested by Earl Maltz. See Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the
Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 499 (1985). I explain below why I find Ely's
arguments on the privileges or immunities Clause unconvincing. See infra text accompanying notes
176-87. Ely concedes that the enactors probably intended the Due Process Clause to have a limited
scope. See J. ELY, supra note 43, at 14-21. It would be odd if the enactors, having rather finite aims
for those two phrases, had an entirely undefined one for the Equal Protection Clause.
175 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
176 J. ELY, supra note 43, at 24. Raoul Berger insists that, notwithstanding the absence of express
language to this effect, the clause was intended to reach only discriminatory treatment of privileges
and immunities. See Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87, 102-06 (1981).
Berger's interpretation is consistent with the construction given the similar language of article IV,
§ 2, and with the express anti-discrimination provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id.
177 J. ELY, supra note 43, at 28.
178 Id. at 23.
179 Id. at 28.
180 Id. at 22-30; see infra notes 204-12.
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consistent with a no-intention position than with one positing some in-
tention. It is true that no competing interpretation fits perfectly with the
evidence from the debates on the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.
In fact, given the character of those debates any particular interpretation
is sure to show substantial deviation from them. Nonetheless, for rea-
sons already discussed,18' this fact does not preclude a determination
that certain applications are, more likely than not, within the scope of the
intentions of those who made the amendment and that certain others are
not.
Two plausible accounts of the intended meaning of "privileges or
immunities" have been offered. Neither is without difficulties, but each is
supported by more affirmative, extrinsic evidence than is the claim that
the phrase was meant to be defined by later decisionmakers.
First, Raoul Berger has argued, with substantial supporting evi-
dence, that by "privileges or immunities" of national citizenship, the en-
actors referred to a more or less well-defined set of rights. These were
intended to cover "civil rights" in the limited nineteenth century use of
the term-that is, the capacity of individuals to enter legal agreements
and statuses which defined their relations with other people-and to as-
sure equality in the application of the criminal law. 182 The etymology of
the phrase may be traced from the guarantees of Article IV of the Arti-
cles of Confederation through the parallel guarantees of Article IV, § 2
of the Constitution1 83 as elaborated in Justice Washington's circuit court
181 See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
182 See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 18-51. In defending the use of the term "civil rights and
immunities" in the 1866 Civil Rights Bill, Representative Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, quoted BOUVmIR's LAW DICIONARY: "Civil rights are those which have no relation to
the establishment, support, or management of government." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1117 (1866). Alexander Bickel concluded that "civil rights" was not used in the fourteenth amend-
ment because it was too broad. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Deci-
sion, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 57 (1955). In his survey of the legislative history of the amendment's
proposal, Bickel concluded:
[S]ection 1 of the fourteenth amendment, like section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, carried
out the relatively narrow objectives of the Moderates, and hence, as originally understood, was
meant to apply neither to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segrega-
tion.
Id. at 58. This conclusion is amply supported by evidence from the legislative record presented in
the article. Bickel's further conclusion that Congress may have intended to leave room for more
expansive future judicial applications, see id. at 59-65, on the other hand, is based almost entirely on
the particular language chosen and Congressional awareness of the "role of the Constitution in the
scheme of American government." Id. at 59.
One commentator has found additional evidence that this same limited definition of the rights
protected by the amendment was understood in some of the ratifying conventions. See Bond, The
Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON
L. Rnv. 435, 443-48 (1985).
183 Articles of Confederation, art. IV ("the free inhabitants of these states.., shall be entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states ...."); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2
("The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States.").
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opinion in Corfield v. Coryel1184 and into the Civil Rights Act of 1866.185
While there are different understandings, 186 the core concerns running
throughout these manifestations are with matters of contract, property,
and criminal liability. 187 Members of Congress frequently repeated the
same themes, again with some exceptions, in the debates on the four-
teenth amendment.1 88
Secondly, Justice Black constructed an extensive and detailed argu-
ment based on the debates of the 39th Congress to show that the "privi-
leges or immunities" clause was intended to make the first eight
amendments to the Constitution enforceable against the states.' 89 This
position was vigorously criticized, 190 and for some time was generally
thought to be discredited. 191 Recently, a modified version of this "in-
corporationist" interpretation has been revived by Michael Kent Cur-
tis. 192 Curtis has strengthened Black's claim by placing the relevant
congressional statements in the context of constitutional views widely
held at the time of the fourteenth amendment's passage.193
Ely rejects each of these arguments. With respect to the narrow
"civil rights" interpretation, he points out that the dictum in Corfield
contains vague terms 194 and that the enumeration of protected rights in
the Civil Rights Act was abandoned in favor of the general terminology
used in the amendment. 195 But those proposing the amendment explic-
itly denied that its terms were vague or that they were radically changing
the dimensions of state authority. 196
As for the interpretation restricting "privileges or immunities" to
the Bill of Rights, Ely notes that this view would render the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment redundant because the "privileges or
immunities" clause of that amendment would already have incorporated
due process from the fifth amendment. 197 He contends further that the
184 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
185 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 21, 14 Stat. 27.
186 See, e.g., Justice Washington's inclusion on his list of privileges and immunities of "the elec-
tive franchise." Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. This was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 174 (1874).
187 See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 20-36.
188 See id.; Comment, supra note 102, at 153-54.
189 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
190 This criticism is most prominently articulated in Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
191 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 101-04 (1962).
192 M. CURTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986).
193 Id. at 36-91.
194 See J. ELY, supra note 43, at 28-30, 198 n.64; Soifer, supra note 9, at 673-75.
195 See 3. ELY, supra note 43, at 30, 198-200 n.66.
196 See Benedict, supra note 129, at 47 n.23, 48 n.26; Maltz, New Thoughts, supra note 11, at 817-
18.
197 J. ELY, supra note 43, at 27.
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Congressional references to the Bill of Rights do not indicate that privi-
leges or immunities were exhausted by those rights. Thus, he concludes,
we are left with the question of what else was included.198
Curtis' work suggests possible responses. 199 The "privilege or im-
munity" of due process may be read as applying only to citizens. The
express due process guarantee, therefore, extends that right to non-citi-
zens. There is some evidence that this was, in fact, a concern of the
drafters. 200 While there were references to rights beyond the Bill of
Rights in the debates, most such statements are consistent with a view
that includes within "privileges or immunities" all federal constitutional
rights-those in the first eight amendments, those in the body of the
Constitution, such as habeas corpus, and the "privileges and immunities"
of Article IV.201 While the last category is less clearly defined, there is
some evidence that the amendment's enactors thought it also referred to
other express constitutional rights2 0 2 or, alternatively, that it was limited
to "civil rights" in the sense discussed above. 20 3
Clearly, these other interpretations are not free of doubt. There is,
however, a body of extrinsic evidence and a logical argument supporting
each of them. And, in comparison, the case for either of them appears
stronger than the claim that the enactors intended to write a blank check
for "later constitutional decision makers. 20 4
2. The Ninth Amendment.-Ely also relies on the ninth amend-
ment's prohibition of constitutional constructions that "deny or dispar-
age [other rights] retained by the people." The conventional
understanding of this provision is that it was directed only at the extent
of the powers granted to the federal government. It was intended to re-
but the negative inference that might arise from the fact that the first
eight amendments appeared to withdraw from the federal government
powers which it otherwise would not have been thought to possess. 20 5
Ely's response is almost entirely semantic. First, he contends that if
the ninth amendment was exclusively directed at limiting federal power,
then it was redundant because the tenth amendment accomplished the
198 Id. at 28.
199 It should be noted that Ely dealt with this question before the appearance of Curtis' work.
200 See M. CURTIS, supra note 192, at 107.
201 See, eg., id. at 85-91, 129-30.
202 See id. at 113-17. Curtis notes that there were many Republicans who thought "privileges or
immunities" included other "fundamental rights," but "there was no consensus on what these rights
were." Id. at 82.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 185-96.
204 J. ELY, supra note 43, at 28.
205 See J. ELY, supra note 43, at 34; E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 63-64 (1957); Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1981); Caplan, The
History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223 (1983).
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same end.20 6 Second, he points out that while the tenth amendment is
explicitly directed to powers, the ninth refers to rights. Rights limit
otherwise proper powers. Ely suggests that it is thus reasonable to think
that with the ninth amendment the enactors were concerned with more
than the general extent of the federal government's authority.20 7
Though appealing, Ely's argument is less persuasive than the con-
ventional understanding discussed above. There is ample evidence that
the constitution-makers were concerned that a Bill of Rights might put at
risk the strict confinement of the federal government within the limits
established in the original Constitution. 208 There is no extrinsic evidence
whatsoever that the enactors thought that the ninth amendment might
provide for an ongoing and unpredictable redefinition of rights. The lan-
guage of the amendment speaks to rights retained not newly created. It
thus appears to speak to rights already in existence with content known
and understood at the time of the amendment. Research suggests that
the drafters had existing rights in mind, whether based in statutory, com-
mon, or even natural law.20 9 Furthermore, neither the language of the
amendment nor the history surrounding it suggest that the rights so "re-
tained" were to be transformed by the amendment into specific federal
constitutional rights, especially, constitutional rights that were to be de-
fined in the future by some unknown process. 210
On the other hand, if the amendment were designed to protect ex-
isting rights, then its method becomes clearer. From what were the
rights to be protected? The amendment indicates that they might be at
risk from a particular construction of the Bill of Rights, that is, a con-
struction expressio unius which could lead to an inference of unstated
206 See J. ELY, supra note 43, at 34-35.
207 See id. at 34-40.
208 The evidence is collected in Berger, supra note 205 and Caplan, supra note 205.
209 See Caplan, supra note 205; Monaghan, Perfect, supra note 11, at 366-67. Ely responds to the
suggestion that the amendment refers to state law rights by noting that the Bill of Rights was in-
tended only to limit the federal government and that it would have been preposterous for the enac-
tors to think there was any possible inference that "the Bill of Rights, controlling only federal action,
had somehow pre-empted the efforts of the people of various states to control the actions of their
state governments" with respect to state constitutional rights, or that "state legislatures and courts
could no longer order relations among their citizens by the creation of nonconstitutional 'rights.'"
J. ELY, supra note 43, at 37 n.*. But if the animating concern was an unwarranted inference as to
the scope of supreme federal power, it seems likely that there was a particular fear that such power
might interfere in state law matters. See Caplan, supra note 205, at 227-28. Caplan cites the amend-
ment proposed by the Pennsylvania ratifying convention stating that Congress had no implicit power
and "that every reserve of the rights of individuals, made by the several constitutions of the states in
the Union, to the citizens and inhabitants of each state respectively, shall remain inviolate, except so
far as they are expressly and manifestly yielded or narrowed by the national Constitution." Id. at
252.
210 See Berger, supra note 205, at 21-22. Ely's view would result in undefined limitations only on
the federal government. See, J. ELY, supra note 43, at 38. To apply these rights against state govern-
ments involves some ultimate reliance on the fourteenth amendment. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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federal powers to encroach those rights. The amendment's protection of
retained rights thus implies only a limited reading of federal powers-the
standard conclusion and one borne out by the legislative history.
Madison, who supervised the passage of the Bill of Rights through Con-
gress, understood that rights would be protected by insisting on the lim-
ited powers of the federal government. In 1789, he wrote to Washington:
If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the rights re-
tained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter be secured by
declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that the former shall not be
extended.211
Perhaps, as Ely suggests, Madison was wrong in conflating rights and
limited powers but he cites no evidence that anyone else in the amending
process saw things differently, 212 while much of the evidence indicates
that others saw them the same way.2 13 Since we are presently working
on the assumption that the original intentions are controlling, we cannot
depart from them merely because they were unartfully expressed. 214
This does, as Ely notes, appear to make the ninth amendment re-
dundant in light of the tenth's express limitation on federal powers. 215
My experience is that redundancy in legal documents is not particularly
odd. And, in this case, the drafting history of the Bill of Rights explains
the presence of both provisions. As originally presented by Madison, the
211 Berger, supra note 205, at 3 (quoting Madison).
212 Ely places some weight on a 1788 letter by Madison to Jefferson in which Ely sees Madison
"separating the question of unenumerated powers from the question of unenumerated rights."
My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not
to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration... 1. because I conceive that in a
certain degree... the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers
are granted. 2. because there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the
most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights of
* conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much more than
they are likely ever to be by an assumed power.
J. ELY, supra note 43, at 35 (quoting letter from J. Madison to T. Jefferson). While the concluding
sentence might be read as noticing an unwritten right of conscience capable of abridgment by a
granted power, it is not at all clear to me that the reference is to a legally enforceable right. It may
be referring to the practice of religion under whatever laws are in place. As a whole, the quotation
does not seem inconsistent my argument.
213 See, eg., text accompanying note 211. Caplan cites John Randolph's preference for a limita-
tion of the powers of the central government to a reservation of rights, seeing them as alternative
ways to protect state law. See Caplan, supra note 205, at 256. Governor Johnston defended the
absence of a Bill of Rights at the North Carolina ratifying convention on the grounds that the same
purposes were served by the fact that Congressional powers were limited to specific grants in the
Constitution. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 141-42 (J. Elliot ed. 1974) [hereinafter DEBATES].
214 See supra text accompanying notes 26-33.
215 See J. ELY, supra note 43, at 36. Caplan denies the amendments are redundant, noting that the
ninth amendment deals with the incapacity of Congress to interfere with existing state law rights,
while the tenth amendment deals with Congress' inability to displace state authorities in future legis-
lation or other governmental functions. Caplan, supra note 205, at 262. Though there may be dis-
tinctions, both amendments are clearly variations of a single idea: maintaining the limits created by
enumerating federal powers.
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provisions of the Bill of Rights were to have been inserted into the body
of the Constitution. Madison wanted to place most of these guarantees
directly after the explicit limitations on congressional power in Article I,
section nine, between clauses three and four.216 These rights were then
to be followed by the language that eventually became the ninth
amendment. 217
Madison had also initially proposed a separate article explicitly es-
tablishing the principle of separation of powers, limiting each branch of
the federal government to the powers appropriate to it and denying to
each the powers belonging to the others.218 But apparently feeling that
such general references to executive, legislative, or judicial powers might
obscure the overall limitation of federal powers to those granted, this
provision was to be followed by the language which ultimately became
the tenth amendment-a reminder that the powers so allocated to the
three branches were only those previously granted. 219 The article was
not to be construed as a further grant of authority; all power not granted
would remain with the states and the people. Thus the same notion was
expressed twice because the new provisions might have raised the objec-
tionable negative inference twice. When the House of Representatives
switched to the articles of amendment format, the current ninth amend-
ment became article 15 (following the new rights), the separation of pow-
ers provision became article 16, and the current tenth amendment was
article 17. When the Senate deleted the separation of powers provision,
the two remaining articles became adjacent, as they are today.220 This
does not make the two provisions any less redundant but it gives a pretty
216 E. DUMBAULD, supra note 205, at 207.
217 The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular rights,
shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limita-
tions of such powers or as inserted merely for greater caution.
E. DUMBAULD, supra note 205, at 208.
218 The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the departments to which
they are respectively distributed: so that the Legislative Department shall never exercise the
powers vested in the Executive or Judicial, nor the Executive exercise the powers vested in the
Legislative or Judicial, nor the Judicial exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Execu-
tive Departments.
E. DUMBAULD, supra note 205, at 209. The model for this type of provision was probably Article
XXX of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
219 "The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively." E. DUMBAULD, supra note 205, at 209.
220 In the amendments reported to the House by the Select Committee, the insertion-in-text for-
mat was preserved. At the conclusion of the list of new rights to be inserted in Article I, section
nine, was the following: "The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id. at 211. The new "Article Seventh"
on separation of powers included this sentence: "The powers not delegated by this Constitution nor
prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively." Id. at 212. Almost identical
language was retained when the House passed the amendment as separate articles of amendment
assigning the numbers mentioned in text. Id. at 215-16.
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good idea of why such redundant expressions might be compatible with
the traditional interpretation of these amendments.
I am not contending here that the conventional interpretation is
proven beyond doubt, only that it is plausible and has evidence to back it
up. On the other hand, the hypothesis that the ninth amendment was
intended to establish a power for the creation of new constitutional rights
has almost nothing in the record to support it. The usual understanding
is, at least, more probable.221
B. Rules of Construction
The second argument that the constitution-makers did not intend
their own intentions regarding the reach of the Constitution to be con-
trolling is based on an evaluation of the general way the enactors in-
tended the courts to implement the Constitution. H. Jefferson Powell, in
the most serious and thorough investigation of "interpretative intention"
yet undertaken, has concluded that the constitution-makers of 1787-89
wanted the Constitution to be interpreted without reference to their in-
tentions but solely according to techniques of judicial construction that
look no further than the text itself.222
Although Powell acknowledges the enactors' frequent references to
terms like legal "intent" and "intention," he contends their usage re-
ferred not to the authors' subjective purposes but to "the meaning the
reader was warranted in deriving from the text. '223 Powell stresses the
period's well established rules of interpretation that imputed to statutory
words the intentions ordinarily associated with them.224 This attach-
ment for a meaning discoverable from the face of the instrument was
consistent with what Powell notes was a strong hostility to the very idea
of interpretation. Both lawyers and statesmen greatly feared judicial ma-
nipulation of statutes.225 They warned against "artful constructions" 226
and the "wiles of construction. ' 227 A rule that mandated adherence to
ordinary meaning would minimize these dangers.228 When no such ordi-
221 It seems most unreasonable to suppose that the authors of the Constitution, having care-
fully established a government of limited and clearly defined powers, would suddenly reverse
themselves and confer on the courts of this government an unspecified and hence limitless
power to "find" additional rights at their discretion and then to rely on these to impose their
will on the States and the people.
Jenkins, Judicial Activism and Constitutional Government, 29 AM. J. JURIS. 169, 175 (1984).
222 Powell, supra note 163, at 948.
223 Id. at 895 (discussing etymology of the word "intent"); see id. at 903-06, 948.
224 Id. at 895-96, n.54. Powell notes, however, that by the Civil War original intentions adjudica-
tion had become the accepted norm. See id. at 947. His conclusions, therefore, cannot automatically
apply to the interpretive intent of the enactors of the Civil War amendments.
225 Id. at 891-94. Lord Mansfield was the paradigm. See M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW 18 (1977).
226 Powell, supra note 163, at 893 (quoting the resolution of the Essex County Convention, 1778).
227 Id. at 893 n.40 (quoting Edmund Pendleton, 1801).
228 Powell cites numerous English cases to establish that this was the prevalent attitude in the
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nary meaning existed, an examination of the related common law, the
mischief the act was to remedy, and the purposes stated in the preamble
were all appropriate sources of meaning.229
This picture of judicial practice in interpretation, however, is not
necessarily inconsistent with the position that the intentions of the
lawmaker are the proper object of interpretation. Instead, it may de-
scribe a particular way of ascertaining those intentions, by using sources
that would be quite relevant to an investigation of the original intentions.
Powell's evidence of the special definition of "intention" employed
by the constitution-makers is not conclusive. It falls roughly into three
categories: restatements of the rule against use of legislative history in
constitutional or statutory interpretation; statements of contemporaries,
especially Madison, on the irrelevance of the original intentions; and ju-
dicial practice in the earliest constitutional cases.
1. The Rule Against Use of Legislative History. -Much of the ma-
terial Powell cites for the proposition that the original intentions were
thought irrelevant can be read to support a far narrower position, one
which only forbid resort to what we now call a law's "legislative his-
tory." As discussed earlier,230 this suspicion of legislative history was
and continues to be the prevailing view in English courts and does not
necessarily entail a rejection of the authority of the original intentions.
Given the paucity and unreliability of legislative materials available in
the constitution-making period, it might have been reasonable to suppose
original intentions might actually have been more reliably identified by
sticking to the ordinary inferences arising from the language of the text
instead of being distracted by the scattered and incomplete extrinsic
evidence.
Indeed, with respect to the Constitution, the question was largely
academic in the period Powell discusses because practically no drafting
history was available until the publication of Madison's notes in 1840.231
What evidence there was in the immediate post-constitutional period
period prior to the enactment of the Constitution. See Powell, supra note 163, at 894-900. Raoul
Berger, however, has collected many contrary judicial authorities from the fifteenth to the eighteenth
centuries. See Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296,
299-303 (1986).
229 See Powell, supra note 163, at 899. Powell states that judicial precedent was "the most impor-
tant source of information about an act's meaning beyond it's actual text". Id. This might be
thought to beg the question because we are concerned in the first place with rules for judicial con-
struction. It thus cannot provide a method for a "first" interpretation. As to subsequent interpreta-
tions, however, there is no reason to doubt Powell's evidence that recourse to precedent was an
accepted technique. But even presumptive adherence to precedent might be justifiable, in part, as a
sound method of finding original intentions in the ordinary course. See the discussion of Madison's
view of the relevance of practice in settling meaning, infra text accompanying notes 247-51.
230 See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
231 See 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 91, at xv. The Journal of the Convention published in 1819
and Yates' notes published in 1821 give a far more limited account of the proceedings. See id. at xi-
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tended to be anecdotal recollections of the constitution-makers them-
selves.232 And, as Powell acknowledges, a significant number of people
believed such information was relevant and reference to it proper in con-
stitutional interpretation. 233 Those who opposed its use, relying on the
traditional English rule, may have believed it unhelpful in the circum-
stances without denying the controlling force of the original intentions
themselves. 234 In sum, this category of evidence does not seem to give
strong support to the very general proposition about the nature of inter-
pretation that Powell suggests.
2. Madison's Position.-Powell suggests that Madison and his con-
temporaries 235 did not believe in the propriety of appeals to evidence
xv. Elliot's compilation of the debates in the state ratifying conventions was published in 1836. 1
DEBATES supra note 213, at iv.
232 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 163, at 917-21 (discussing the 1796 debate in the House of Repre-
sentatives on Congress' power to require the executive to produce documents connected with negoti-
ation of the Jay Treaty).
233 For example, George Washington based his refusal to comply with the House's demand for
papers on his own recollection of the debate and actions at the Philadelphia convention. Powell also
notes that Maryland Representative William Van Murray cited the Convention's official journal.
Other Congressmen who relied on the original intentions were more general in their references.
Powell notes objections to reliance on this kind of evidence but those objections can be understood
largely as restatements of the rule against recourse to legislative history. See id.
234 For example, Powell cites Representative Lyman as one who denied the relevance of "materi-
als from the framing and ratification process," and who insisted on "the ancient rules" for the inter-
pretation and construction of laws or constitutions. But Lyman defended his own interpretation
with the following argument:
But it had been asserted that this power, insisted upon on the part of the House, was a
novel doctrine, introduced merely upon the spur of the present occasion; notwithstanding
which, it had been proved by several gentlemen who had spoken upon the question, that this
interpretation was given to the Constitution in most of the State Conventions at the time of the
adoption; that the same interpretation had also been given, at that time, by the writers both for
and against its adoption. It had appeared, from the extracts of publications at that period, that
whatever might have been the diversity of opinion in other respects relative to the Constitution,
that in this construction, at least, both the friends and opposers perfectly agreed.
5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 604 (1796) (remarks of Rep. William Lyman). Raoul Berger has collected
a number of references indicating a notion of intention that seems to refer to the actual subjective
intentions of flesh and blood legislators. For example, Thomas Rutherforth is quoted as stating in
the 1750s: "The end which interpretation aims at is to find out what was the intention of the writer
to clear up the meaning of his words.. ." Berger, supra note 12, at 21. James Wilson is quoted
shortly after the Convention as saying: "The first and governing maxim in the interpretation of a
statute is to discover the meaning of those who made it." Id.
235 See Powell, supra note 163, at 935-41. Powell says Hamilton also held a limited and artificial
notion of intention. In his opinion on the constitutionality of the bill to create a federal bank, Hamil-
ton argued that "whatever may have been the intention of the framers . . . that intention is to be
sought in the instrument itself, according to the usual and established rules of construction. Nothing
is more common than for laws to express and effect more or less than was intended." Powell, supra
note 163, at 915 (quoting A. Hamilton). In THE FEDERALIST No. 83, Hamilton said "[t]he rules of
legal interpretation are rules of common sense adopted by the courts in the construction of the laws."
Id. at 911 (emphasis in original). In his bank opinion, however, Hamilton supported his position by
references to "the intent of the Convention," and by amendments proposed in the state conventions.
See 3 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 445, 453, 488 (H. Lodge ed. 1904). Also, as Powell
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from the constitution-making process. Nevertheless, there are instances
where Madison seems to have used "intention" in such a way that it
could only mean the beliefs of the particular people who wrote and
adopted the Constitution. 23 6
Madison did note in The Federalist No. 37 the inherent limits on the
communicative capacity of language, 237 but he made this point to illus-
trate the great difficulties facing the framers and the inevitable imperfec-
tions in their work not as an argument on the futility of attempting to
discover actual intentions. Linguistic limitations were to Madison a mis-
fortune-but one which, like other problems facing them, the framers
had "surmounted and surmounted with a unanimity almost as unprece-
dented as it must be unexpected. It is impossible for any man of candor
to reflect on this circumstance without partaking of astonish-
ment. . .. ,"238 He saw in this achievement the "finger of the Almighty
hand which has been so frequently extended to our relief. '239
Many of the other statements Powell quotes are merely recitations
of the ordinary rule barring explicit examination of the legislative his-
tory.240 Madison also sometimes rejected sources of interpretation not
because he rejected reliance on the enactors' intentions, but because the
particular sources relied on did not accurately reflect the intention of the
right people.241 So when Madison suggested that The Federalist might
not always be a useful source because the authors were "sometimes influ-
enced by the zeal of advocates, '242 he implied no more than that they
might give a distorted picture of the original intentions. Indeed, many of
his statements against original intention go to the single point that the
intentions of the Philadelphia Convention were not "authoritative inten-
tions. '243 But this is not to say that Madison believed there was no such
notes, it is Hamilton who, in THE FEDERALIST No. 78, forcefully advanced the idea that the courts
in applying the Constitution would do no more than make effective the will of the sovereign people.
Powell, supra note 163, at 911. The power of judicial review does not "suppose a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both;
and that where the will of the legislature, declared in statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the
former." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
236 See Powell, supra note 163, at 937 n.267.
237 See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228-29 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Richard Weis-
berg says this language is evidence that "[f]aith in language was foreign to [the framers]." Weisberg,
supra note 146, at 993.
238 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 230-31 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
239 Id.
240 See Powell, supra note 163, at 921.
241 Id. at 936.
242 Id.
243 See id. at 938-39 & n.278 (quoting 1830 letter of Madison: "It must be kept in mind that the
only authoritative intentions were those of the people of the States, as expressed through the Con-
ventions which ratified the Constitution."). Madison's views on this point are elaborated in Lofgren,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMM. 77 (1988). Powell acknowledges
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thing as "authoritative intentions" of actual enactors.244 This is borne
out by the fact that on receiving an inquiry about the Philadelphia fram-
ers' intentions, Madison did not deny the relevance of such an inquiry
but directed it instead to those whom he believed were the "real" consti-
tution-makers-the state ratifying conventions.245
Powell also argues that Madison believed the meaning of the Consti-
tution could be settled after the fact by a continuous and uniform prac-
tice.246 In The Federalist No. 37, Madison wrote that "all new laws...
are considered more or less obscure and equivocal until their meaning be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular decisions and adjudi-
cations. '247 He relied on this rationale when he signed the act creating
the Second Bank of the United States, notwithstanding his prior opinion
that such an act was unconstitutional. 248 The creation and long accept-
ance of the First Bank amounted to "a construction put on the Constitu-
tion by the nation which, having made it, had the supreme right to
declare its meaning." 249 Given that experience and the utility of the
bank itself, Madison "did not feel [himself], as a public man, at liberty to
sacrifice all these public considerations to [his] private opinion. '250
These expressions might be rationalizations for an embarrassing change
of mind, but they also support the view of the Constitution that Powell
attributes to Madison.
Still, Madison's statements can be read in a more limited sense-not
as recognizing the right of subsequent practice to change the meaning of
the Constitution, but viewing subsequent practice as evidence of original
meaning. These statements may exhibit a belief in the wisdom of defer-
that "in the heat of the congressional debate over Hamilton's bank bill" Madison cited the actions of
the Philadelphia Convention. Id. at 939, n.278.
244 See supra note 243.
245 The meaning of the Constitution, he wrote, is to be sought "not in the proceedings of the
Body that proposed it, but in those of the State Conventions which gave it all the validity and
authority it possesses." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 91, at 518 (Letter from Madison to N.P. Trist,
December 1831) To another constitutional researcher Madison wrote:
I cannot but highly approve the industry with which you have searched for a key to the sense of
the Constitution, where alone the true one can be found; in the proceedings of the Convention,
the contemporary expositions, and above all in the ratifying Conventions of the States. If the
instrument be interpreted by criticisms which lose sight of the intention of the parties to it, in
the fascinating pursuit of objects of public advantage or conveniency, the purest motives can be
no security against innovations materially changing the features of the Government.
3 M. FARRAND, supra note 91, at 474 (Letter from Madison to A. Stevenson, March 25, 1826). The
same opinion was expressed in the congressional debates Powell cites. For example, Albert Gallatin
objected to references to the Journal of the Convention, noting that the opinions espoused in Phila-
delphia were "unknown to the people when they adopted the instrument." See Powell, supra note
163, at 920. See generally Lofgren, supra note 243.
246 See Powell, supra note 163, at 939-41.
247 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
248 See Powell, supra note 163, at 939-40.
249 Id.
250 Letter from Madison to LaFayette (November, 1826), reprinted in 3 LETTERS & OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 538, 542 (Philadelphia, 1865) [hereinafter LErrERS].
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ring in certain circumstances to the prior judgment on the correct mean-
ing implicit in the continuing practice. If the determination of original
intentions is often difficult and uncertain, then the policy of settling on a
single meaning may counsel some humility in not insisting on the cor-
rectness of an interpretation different from that of the people creating the
relevant practice. This outlook is consistent with a letter Madison later
wrote that compared his position as President with that of a judge whose
interpretation of the law is rejected by a majority of his colleagues. A
judge has a duty to subordinate his personal view to the institutional
determination of the court. For Madison, the public duty of an official,
whether judge or president, with a non-standard opinion of the meaning
of the law was to subordinate that view to the majority. The president
"will find it impossible to adhere and act officially upon his solitary opin-
ion as to the meaning of the law or Constitution in opposition to a con-
struction reduced to practice during a reasonable period of time; more
especially when no prospect existed of a change of construction by the
people or its agents."' 251 This proposition may not deal with ascertaining
meaning but with the circumstances in which an official should yield to
someone else's determination of meaning when different from his own.
A great deal of evidence shows that Madison did not approve of the
idea that public officials had the right to alter the meaning of the Consti-
tution. For example, he criticized judicial constructions that expanded
federal authority beyond the grants of power specified in the Constitu-
tion.252 Such cases, he wrote, make the Constitution "something very
different from its legitimate character as the offspring of the national
will."'253 And he complained that "some of the terms of the Federal
Constitution have already undergone perceptible deviations from their
original import. '2 54 If the Constitution turned out to be ill suited to new
problems "it ought to be amended but by the authority which made it,
not by the authority subordinate to it. ' '255 Madison expressed this posi-
tion even more explicitly in a letter:
I concur entirely in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it
is the legitimate Constitution and if that be not the guide in expounding it
there can be no security for a constant and stable; more than for a faithful
251 Letter from Madison to C. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831) reprinted in 4 LETTERS, supra note 250,
at 183, 185.
252 Letter from Madison to John Jackson (Dec. 22, 1821), quoted in Berger, supra note 228, at
334.
253 Id.
254 Letter from Madison to Professor Davis (ca. 1832, not posted) quoted in Lofgren, supra note
243, at 106.
255 Id.
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exercise of its power. 256
Madison's views over a long life are bound to be complex, and to some
degree, inconsistent. But on balance, the statements adduced do not
demonstrate a belief in the irrelevance of the intentions of the constitu-
tion-makers.
3. Judicial Practice.-Powell cites Chisolm v. Georgia2 57 to show
that courts in the early constitutional era ignored what we now believe to
be the clear intention expressed in the ratification debates that states
would be immune to suit in federal court.258 While the Court did not
rely on extrinsic materials, it does not follow that some of the judges, at
least, did not think they were applying the actual intentions of the enac-
tors. Justice Wilson's repeated references to what the "people of the
United States intended" appear to be directed toward an actual historical
event.259 In dissent, Justice Iredell was even more precise: "The framers
of the Constitution, I presume, must have meant one of two things
..."260 These expressions in both opinions looked backward, presuma-
bly to the human minds that initiated the constitutional regime.261
Powell similarly claims that Chief Justice Marshall shared this arti-
ficial notion of intention.262 Although he drew his inferences primarily
from the words and structure of the Constitution, Marshall repeatedly
used "intention" in connection with specific human beings.263 In Sturgis
v. Crowninshield,264 decided in 1824, he interpreted the contracts clause
by relying on the intentions of "the Convention" and on what "we know
from the history of the times that the mind of the Convention was di-
256 Letter from Madison to H. Lee (June 24, 1824) quoted in Berger, supra note 228, at 326.
Other quotations from Madison of a similar nature are found in id. at 324-35.
257 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793).
258 Powell, supra note 163, at 922.
259 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) at 464. Powell appears to think these references are merely to the
ordinary rules of construction. Powell, supra note 163, at 923. If so, this form of words for such a
reference tells us something about what these rules were thought to be used for.
260 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 432. At least on one occasion, however, Justice Iredell expressed
a view of constitutional interpretation rather squarely at odds with an adherence to actual original
intentions. Powell notes that in a grand jury charge delivered in 1799 on the constitutionality of the
Alien Act, Iredell discussed an interpretation of the "migration and importation" clause premised on
extrinsic evidence of the enactors' intentions: "But, though this probably is the real truth, yet, if in
attempting to compromise, they have unguardedly used expressions that go beyond their meaning,
and there is nothing but private history to elucidate it, I shall deem it absolutely necessary to confine
myself to the written instrument." Powell, supra note 163, at 922 n.202 (quoting Iredell). Note,
even here, Iredell connects the language chosen to the drafters' attempt at compromise.
261 Of course, the quick overturning of the result in Chisolm by the Eleventh Amendment is some
indication that whatever deviation from the original intentions was involved in the case was widely
disapproved. See Berger, supra note 228, at 320.
262 Powell supra note 163, at 894 n.46, 942-44.
263 See, e.g., id. at 943 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188-89 (1824)); supra
text accompanying notes 221-28.
264 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
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rected to ... .,,265 In Sturgis, he defended a "plain meaning rule" partly
because of its consistency with the original intentions. He also suggested
a version of the "golden rule" discussed earlier:266
[I]f, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any
other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we
believe the framers of that instrument could not intend -what they say, it
must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision
to the case, would be so monstrous that all mankind would, without hesita-
tion, unite in rejecting, the application.
This is certainly not such a case.
... It seems scarcely possible to suppose that the framers of the consti-
tution, if intending to prohibit only laws authorizing the payment of debts
by installment would have expressed that intention by saying "no State
shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." No men would so
express such an intention .... 267
This view does place great weight on the ordinary meanings of the
words of the text, but it also concedes, in its very expression, the para-
mount authority of the original intentions. In fact, in the great case of
McCulloch v. Maryland, decided the same year,268 Marshall again re-
ferred to "the Convention" 269 and "the framers of the Constitution. '270
He also cited The Federalist but insisted on the Court's power, in particu-
lar cases, to "judge of [those essays'] correctness. '271 Marshall's numer-
ous judicial references to the people, the framers and the Convention
cannot be easily dismissed as mere figures of speech.
It is possible that the constitution-makers intended to create a con-
stitutional rule enforcing the prevailing practice on statutory construc-
tion-that is, barring the use of legislative materials in constitutional
adjudication. This is a question of intention like any other, and one
which I have not yet answered to my own satisfaction. I do not think
Powell's material disposes of the issue. The practice immediately follow-
ing enactment is not persuasive one way or another because of the ab-
sence of reliable legislative materials. Moreover, constitutional
265 Id. at 202.
266 See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
267 Sturgis, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 202-03, 205.
268 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
269 Id. at 416 ("[T]he Convention was not unmindful of the subject.").
270 Id. at 420.
271 Id. at 433. Indeed, in McCulloch he did not find The Federalist wrong, but rather, the inter-
pretation put on it. Id. at 435. He then claimed the authors of The Federalist would have agreed
with him:
Had the authors of those excellent essays been asked, whether they contended for that construc-
tion of the constitution, which would place within the reach of the States those measures which
the government might adopt for the execution of its powers; no man, who has read their instruc-
tive pages, will hesitate to admit, that their answer must have been in the negative.
Id. See also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.).
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construction might have been thought to present different considerations
from statutory interpretation. Some evidence suggests that resort to ex-
trinsic materials might have been thought proper in the constitutional
context.272 In any event, the issue, while important, is far narrower than
the general issue of whether judges ought to look to the original inten-
tions-whatever the allowable sources or techniques for doing so-or to
some other, undefined sources of values.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the argument that the constitu-
tion-makers did not want their intentions to bind future generations is
not very persuasive. This seems especially true when considered in light
of the pervasive notion that the virtue of a written constitution lay in its
capacity to fix the limits of proper governmental action.273
C. The Role of the Judiciary
An equally serious problem with this objection is that, as presented,
it is incomplete. It is negative in that its purpose is to show that the
intentions of the enactors were not intended to govern. It is difficult to
believe, however, that the enactors did not have some affirmative ideas of
how the Constitution was to be applied to questions of governmental
power. Yet the evidence that they held some particular alternative un-
derstanding is almost entirely absent.274
If the purpose of the objection is to support a form of constitutional
adjudication that relies on something other than the rules of the Consti-
tution as understood by their enactors, it is up to the objectors to show
that such other form of adjudication was intended. The suggestion that
the constitution-makers wanted to vest such an awful and ill defined au-
thority in judges, however, is implausible on its face. 275
In the period of the Constitution's creation, it is well documented
that there was "a profound fear of judicial independence and discretion."
272 See Powell, supra note 163, at 915-17.
273 See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 290-91.
274 The argument of H. Jefferson Powell, discussed supra text accompanying notes 163-265, does
include such an alternate conception. He suggests that the enactors contemplated constitutional
interpretation based on well established rules of statutory construction. But just how those rules
work out is unclear. To the extent that he emphasizes reliance on judicial precedent, see Powell
supra note 163, at 899, it is still left to determine how the original judicial interpretation, upon which
subsequent judges rely, and which, therefore, defines pretty much all subsequent interpretation, will
be chosen. With respect to such other factors as the mischief to remedied, the preamble and the
background law, see id. at 898-99, we really seem to have nothing more than original intentions
adjudication without recourse to legislative materials.
275 [IThe claim is necessarily that at some point (or points) in American history governmental
officials delegated to the judiciary, in particular to the Supreme Court, authority to enforce
against government, not particular value judgments the framers had deliberated and constitu-
tionalized, but unspecified value judgments not constitutionalized or even always foreseen by
the framers. That would have been a remarkable delegation for politicians to grant to an insti-
tution like the Supreme Court ....
M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 20.
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In the colonial period, this was dealt with by "repeated resort to written
charters. '276 The dominant political theory strictly limited the judicial
role and sensed danger in any arrangements that might tempt the judges
out of that role. Montesquieu, whose central tenets the "American Re-
publican ideologues could recite. .... as if it had been a catechism, '277
insisted that the judges should be "no more than the mouth that pro-
nounces the words of the law."' 278 The risk that judges would transgress
this limited realm was particularly great in the construction of written
law.279 Thus Jefferson warned: "Our peculiar security is in the posses-
sion of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by Con-
struction. '280 In 1776 Jefferson had written that the judge must "be a
mere machine. ''281
Gordon Wood has shown how the early statesmen dealt with the
tension between their insistence on reason and equity in the law, even
legislative law, and their fear of undefined judicial power.282 It was re-
solved by conceiving of the people as always superior to the legislature,
and the people's will as being expressed in the written constitutions. The
judge's role was merely to translate and execute that expressed will when
it came into conflict with legislation. The judges were the people's "ser-
vants for this purpose. '28 3 Wood writes:
The judges were not, as was sometimes thought, "appointed arbiters" of the
Constitution "to determine, as it were, upon any application, whether the
Assembly have or have not violated the constitution." Rather, they were
simply judicial officials fulfilling their duty of applying the proper law ....
The exercise of this power, said Iredell, was "unavoidable," for the Consti-
tution was not "a mere imaginary thing about which ten thousand different
opinions may be formed, but a written document to which all may have
recourse, and to which, therefore, the judges cannot wistfully blind
themselves. 284
This limited role for the judiciary is best illustrated by the well-
known debate at the Philadelphia Convention on the proposed "Council
of Revision," in which judges would have shared the veto power with the
president. 285 Both advocates and opponents saw judges performing dis-
276 G. WOOD, supra note 153, at 298. See Berger, supra note 12, at 15.
277 F. MCDONALD, supra note 109, at 81.
278 Id. at 82 (quoting Montesquieu).
279 See M. HORWITZ, supra note 225, at 12-13, 17-18. Horwitz notes that only in the last ten to
twenty years of the eighteenth century was the distrust of judicial discretion extended to common
law adjudication, but that fears ofjudicial overreaching in statutory construction were common well
before then. Id. at 12-13.
280 Powell, supra note 163, at 893 n.40 (quoting Jefferson).
281 G. WOOD, supra note 153, at 161 (quoting Jefferson). Numerous expressions of the period
evidencing a distrust of judicial discretion are collected at R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 306-11.
282 See G. WOOD, supra note 153, at 304-05.
283 Id. at 456 (quoting Providence Gazette, May 12, 1787).
284 Id. at 461-62.
285 See R. BERGER supra note 6, at 302-06.
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tinctly non-judicial functions while sitting on the Council. James Wil-
son, who favored the idea, felt that though "as expositors of the laws,"
judges would have no power to correct laws that "may be unwise, may be
dangerous, may be destructive, and yet not so unconstitutional as to jus-
tify the judges in refusing to give them effect," their talents should also be
employed in the Council by giving them a "share in the revisionary
power. '286 Elbridge Gerry opposed the action just because it was too
dissimilar to ordinary judicial activity. "It was," he said, "making states-
men of the judges; and setting them up as guardians of the Rights of the
people. '2 87 Moreover, Gerry thought the plan created the risk that
judges might mix up their two roles and bring the entirely unsuitable
considerations of the Council of Revision into their deliberations as
judges.288 These debates show a conception of judges qua judges that
excludes any role as formulators of some values apart fron positive
law.289
There is also no evidence that the enactors of any later amendments
intended this vastly increased judicial role. If the Civil War amendments
were intended to expand any branch's power, that branch must have
been the legislature not the judiciary. 290 Congress' attitudes towards the
judiciary in the Reconstruction period were complicated, but it seems
accurate to say that they ranged only from skepticism to outright hostil-
ity.291 While the fourteenth amendment was adopted after judicial re-
view was well established, there is no reason to think the courts were
intended to play any more than their ordinary role, that is, applying the
values enunciated by the constitution-makers or by Congress acting
286 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 91, at 73 (remarks of James Wilson, July 21, Madison's Notes).
287 Id. at 75 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry, July 21, 1787 Madison's Notes).
288 See id. at 77-80; id. at 75 (remarks of Caleb Strong, July 21); id. at 79 (remarks of Nathaniel
Gorham, July 21); id. at 80 (remarks of John Rutledge, July 21); id. at 300 (remarks of Roger
Sherman, August 15).
289 Ely says it is a "cheap shot" to note that no legislative history supports judicial enforcement of
the ninth amendment, since there is little legislative history supporting any kind of judicial review. J.
ELY, supra note 43, at 40. It is hard to understand how an argument for a relatively unrestrained
power of judicial review is helped by the fact that there is not much evidence for any kind of judicial
review. In fact, there is fairly strong evidence that the enactors were familiar with and expected
judicial enforcement of the Constitution. R. BERGER, CONGRESS Vs. THE SUPREME COURT 50-116
(1969).
290 See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 227-28. Representative Bingham, speaking to the amend-
ment, argued:
There was a want hitherto, and there remains a want now, in the Constitution of our country,
which the proposed amendment will supply. What is that? It is the power in the people, the
whole people of the United States, by express authority of the Constitution to do that by con-
gressional enactment which hitherto they have not had the power to do, and have never even
attempted to do; that is, to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all citizens
of the Republic ....
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. Ist Sess. 2542 (1866); see also id. at 2766 (remarks of Sen. Howard).
291 S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 64-88 (1968); Kutler, Ex
Parte McCardle: Judicial Impotency? The Supreme Court and Reconstruction Reconsidered, 72 AM.
HisT. REV. 835 (1967).
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under the amendment's power. 292 The argument that particular provi-
sions of the fourteenth amendment were without defined substance has
already been discussed.293 The same reasoning argues against the claim
that the amendment was intended to vest the courts with the kind of
authority which modem models of constitutional adjudication suggest.
To summarize, the second objection assumes that the interpretative
intentions of the enactors ought to control constitutional interpretation
and that those intentions were that substantive intentions should not con-
trol. The latter can be reduced to a mere (although certainly difficult)
question of historical fact. We know that the constitution-makers
thought it was important to enact written constitutional rules. We know
they took great pains to choose the terms they did and that they argued
about the best language and about the merits of the proposals before
them as if their decisions on these things would make a difference. 294 We
would not expect such deliberation from people who wanted their inten-
tions to be ignored or to play a minor role in the future application of the
rules they made. A strong case would seem in order from those who
would impute such a desire to them. I do not contend that such a claim
could never be proven. But it does not seem to me to have been proven
yet.
V. THIRD OBJECTION: IT'S WRONG
In the last two sections I have attempted to show that original inten-
tions adjudication, while admittedly a difficult and imperfect exercise, is
possible both in theory and in the practical circumstances presented by
our courts and Constitution. I have also argued that such adjudication is
not incompatible with the original intentions themselves. But, even if
such adjudication is both possible and coherent, it must face a final objec-
tion: that original intentions adjudication makes for bad government and
bad law. While rarely put so bluntly, 295 this is the most potent of the
three objections that I have listed. Its power derives from the fact that,
unlike the first two, refuting it requires more than simply an appeal to
facts, history, or ordinary experience. This objection is the expression of
a political and moral judgment about the best way for people to live in
society. As such, conventional argument can take us only so far.
To evaluate this objection, we cannot consider original intentions
adjudication in isolation, as we were able to do with the first two objec-
tions. The judgment here is necessarily relative: original intentions adju-
292 See Maltz, New Thoughts, supra note 11, at 818-19.
293 See supra text accompanying notes 174-209.
294 See R. BERGER, supra note 128, at 93 (citing debates and amendments at Philadelphia Con-
vention focusing on specific word choices).
295 But see Perry, supra note 15, at 576-87; Simon, supra note 5, at 1494-1531.
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dication must be worse than some other system in which constitutional
decisions are made according to some standards or processes other than
fidelity to the original intentions.
Adherence to the original intentions, like any other purposive
human activity, involves a choice. Legal words cannot magically bring
about the state of affairs they describe.296 The force of law results from
the attitudes and reactions of human beings in response to legal rules.
These attitudes and reactions, in turn, arise from widely shared (and
largely tacit) political preferences. But there is no reason to think that
those decisions are made only once, for all time. They are always provi-
sional, always capable of being abandoned. 297 And because these choices
inevitably reflect particular values they will always be, when fully under-
stood, potentially controversial.298
Put more concretely, the plan of government intended by the cre-
ators of the United States Constitution could and can have only those
effects which people-both public and private-choose to give it
(although the choice is rarely conscious). This essay is about one such
choice-reconstruction in practice of a government conforming to the
one conceived in theory by the constitution-makers. Original intentions
adjudication would entail such a choice by judges, particularly the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court.
The choice of following or rejecting the original intentions is neces-
sarily not a legal choice, but a moral and political one.299 It must be
prior to law even-indeed especially-the law of the Constitution and is,
in this sense, preconstitutional.3 0° Our experience with political and
296 See Hamilton, Constitutionalism 4 ENCY. Soc. Sci. 255 (1931) ("Constitutionalism is the
name given to the trust which men repose in the power of words engrossed on parchment to keep
government in order.").
297 See Hegland, Good-Bye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1211 (1985).
298 See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205, 215-16
(1979).
299 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 366-67; Dworkin, supra note 82, at 473-74, 496-97; Kay,
supra note 30, at 193; Perry, supra note 15, at 582-83; Simon, supra note 5, at 1487. The same is true
with the parallel arguments in the field of literary criticism. See E. HIRsCH, supra note 23, at 7-8, 77.
E. D. Hirsch has posed the issue in terms strikingly similar to those involved in the legal dispute
about original intentions adjudication:
[T]he politics of interpretation resides in the choice between the autocratic and allocratic
norm. Under the autocratic norm, authority resides in the reader, while under the allocratic
norm, the reader delegates authority to the reconstructed historical act of another person or
community .... [A]utocratic interpretation is not in principle revisable except by accidental
changes of preference whereas allocratic interpretation is revisable ex post facto on the basis of
changing theories and evidence about a determinative historical event. Hence the autocratic
norm is a priori and incorrigible; the allocratic norm is a posteriori and revisable. The authority
to choose one of these norms lies with the reader, and this choice, being free, is ethical or
political in nature; it is entirely unconstrained by epistemological considerations.
Hirsch, supra note 65, at 327-28. Walter Benn Michaels has said, the choice is whether to read the
Constitution-or to write it. See Michaels, Response, supra note 21, at 678-79; see also T.
EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 69; Hirsch, supra note 147, at 81.
300 See Kay, supra note 30, at 189-90. Insofar as this decision defines the law of the Constitution
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moral differences indicates that we should not be too optimistic about
our capacity to resolve them by rational argument.301 This is certainly
true with regard to the questions at issue here.
Nevertheless, clarifying the moral and political nature of those ques-
tions does serve some useful purposes. First, it enables us to separate this
basic value judgment from the essentially technical objections to original
intentions adjudication discussed in the previous two sections.30 2 Sec-
ond, it encourages making explicit the underlying values that may cause
us to prefer one preconstitutional choice to another. Thus, it opens the
possibility that we may narrow our differences to the proper means of
achieving goals we share or to the different weights we ought to give
those goals. Finally, however, we will be left with differences about the
best way for people to live together. No law book will show us the right
side of such a disagreement.
With this background, the third objection to original intentions ad-
judication might be put this way: limiting government by fixed rules in-
tended by people in the more or less distant past will yield less
satisfactory political and social consequences than will some other limit-
ing technique. The exact nature of the objection depends on the prof-
fered alternative, but most versions find similar problems with
submission to the original intentions. These problems involve the inca-
pacity of set, abstract rules to respond over time to our collective and
individual well-being. The objection, therefore, presupposes that judges
can apply fixed rules to particular instances of adjudication. In light of
the discussion in the previous two sections, this assumption requires fur-
ther examination.
I have argued that original intentions adjudication does not depend
on the ability to discover with certainty the governing intentions.3 03
Nevertheless, the probability judgments on which individual results will
turn will be based on data that is, in theory, and largely in fact, both fixed
and available. 3°4 Consequently, constitutional rules will be capable of
and insofar as the Constitution is the benchmark for all other valid law-making, the choice is
equivalent to selection of a "rule of recognition" as expounded by H.L.A. Hart. See H. HART, supra
note 25, at 96-107.
301 [O]ne cannot successfully contend for legitimacy, as a matter of democratic theory, ofjudi-
cial activism in human rights cases without presupposing that there are right answers to polit-
ical-moral questions-without presupposing, that is, that political-moral claims are cognitive
claims, that truth and falsity are properties of values, in short, that there is moral knowledge.
Perry, supra note 130, at 73-74. On the relationship between moral theories and constitutional adju-
dication, see Morawetz, Constitutional Review and Moral Premises: The Future of an Illusion (un-
published manuscript, 1985) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).
302 See supra text accompanying notes 50-293; see Michaels, Fate, supra note 21, at 775-76.
303 See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
304 1 assume here that the method will be applied honestly and intelligently by judges. This raises
a question which might properly have been considered in Section III. There, I argued that adher-
ence to an interpretation based on the original intentions was possible and practical. But it may be
that my assumption about the capacity and good faith of judges, on which these arguments depend,
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determination in advance of its possible application in some action.305
This is not to say that the results of such constitutional adjudication will
be perfectly predictable or that the interpretations emerging from it will
be immune to reconsideration or change. The approach, however, is
about as stable and objective as human beings can contrive while still
working with a constitution sufficiently complex to be a workable instru-
ment of government. Other competing models of judicial review depend
much more on judicial elaboration of broad, ill-defined standards and
they authorize some judicial evolution of these principles over time.30 6
is unrealistic. That is, original intentions adjudication may be impossible because judges will be
unable to resist the temptation to stray from the original intentions in order to achieve a result that
seems right to them. The temptation may, in accordance with Lord Acton's observation about
power, be irresistible in the Supreme Court because there is no further legal review. Certainly the
evidence of our judicial history reinforces these doubts. See Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of
Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441 (1979) (arguing and approving the inevitable
instability of the law.) This is an extremely important question and the significance of one's convic-
tions about the issues discussed in this article may well turn on the answer. My own feeling is that
human beings can, at least for some length of time following a constitution's creation, apply it in
most cases in the sense in which it was intended. See Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the
Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 833, 844-45 (1931). In any event, insofar as the question is a
comparative one, the opportunities and temptations to "cheat," consciously or unconsciously, by
departing from the prescribed decision-making model are far greater in the competing suggestions as
to the proper character of judicial review.
305 Frederick Schauer has shown how giving a more precise form to legal rules (which, according
to the reasoning in the text, would follow from original intentions adjudication) may itself give rise
to more situations to which no rules apply because the very precision will necessarily exclude unfore-
seen events. The potential breadth of the universe subject to legal authority is, therefore, increased
when we make rules more indeterminate (or when we adjudicate in a way having the same effect).
Such a development extends the control of officials (especially judges) as it necessarily commits the
determination of the propriety of the challenged action to a more discretionary, and, therefore, more
unpredictable, decision. See Schauer, Authority and Indeterminacy, in NoMos XXIX: AUTHORIrry
REvisrrED 28 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1987). Original intentions adjudication advances the
value of certainty by denying such flexibility to judicial decision. The cases consequently unprovided
for are determined by the "back-up" rules discussed supra text accompanying notes 125-30. These
back-up rules permit a reasonable estimate of the legality of government action although they may,
because of new circumstances in a given case, not appear sensible according to some coherent
scheme of public values held by the constitution-makers or anybody else.
306 See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 101 (Judicial review should "deal with those political
issues that are also fundamental moral problems in a way that is faithful to the notion of moral
evolution (and, therefore, to our collective religious self-understanding)--not simply by invoking
established moral conventions but by seizing such issues as opportunities for moral reevaluation and
possible moral growth."); Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a
Theory of the Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 618 (1985) (Judicial review
"should be guided mainly by what is good and just, although this too is a question of fact .... );
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication
83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). On the relative indeterminacy of such approaches, see J. ELY, supra note
43, at 43-72; Grano, supra note 11, at 61-75.
Modern constitutional adjudication, while certainly not defensible under the original intentions,
typically does not invoke any alternative method of decision-making, but explicitly claims the sanc-
tion of "the Constitution." See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 771-72 (1986) ("We recognized at the very beginning of our opinion in Roe...
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In practice, judges applying these standards will be less constrained by
the discipline of the process and more inconsistent decisions will be de-
fensible as proper applications. 30 7 The outstanding characteristic of orig-
inal intentions adjudication, for good or ill, is that it is, compared with
the alternative methods, most likely to produce relatively clear and stable
rules for lawful government activity.308
Yet it is exactly this aspect of original intentions adjudication which
forms the basis of the third objection. The argument is that such fixed
rules would impose outdated and unduly rigid restrictions on govern-
ment behavior. "[T]here is no justification," Paul Brest has written, "for
binding the present to the compromises of another age."' 30 9 The Consti-
tution is a long-term proposition and to do things in the way and within
the limits intended by the enactors is bound to become increasingly un-
comfortable. 310 (It is assumed in this kind of argument that the rigors of
the amendment process make amending the Constitution too difficult
and, therefore, unavailable as a practical matter.)311
Such restrictions will have two kinds of adverse consequences.
First, they will prevent the government from accomplishing things the
national welfare urgently requires because another set of people, living in
a time when such problems were unimaginable, intended that such acts
not be done by government. A good example may be government power
to suspend or abridge contractual liability in an era of world-wide and
deep-rooted economic depression, a phenomenon unknown to the origi-
that abortion raises moral and spiritual questions over which honorable persons can disagree sin-
cerely and profoundly. But these disagreements did not then and do not now relieve us of our duty
to apply the Constitution faithfully."). It is not at all clear just what is meant by "the Constitution"
in such citations. In such circumstances the Constitution serves not so much as an object of inter-
pretation as of incantation. But see M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 143-44 n.*; Saphire, Constitutional
Theory in Perspective: A Response to Professor Van Alstyne, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1435, 1447-49 (1984).
307 I speak here only of models which have some defensible claim to political legitimacy. See
supra note 136. Thus adherence to some plain or standard meaning of the constitutional text might
be argued to involve more stability and predictability than original intentions adjudication. See, eg.,
Moore, supra note 16, at 258 (making this argument with respect to statutory interpretation). But,
for reasons argued above, that approach would lack any reference to an authorized maker of law.
See supra text accompanying notes 21-32.
308 See Maltz, Constitutional Originalism, supra note 11, at 51.
309 Brest, supra note 6, at 229 n.96. Michael Moore's view is exemplary:
Better that we fill out the grand clauses of the Constitution by our notions of meaning
(evolving, as we have seen, in light of our developing theories about the world), by our notions
of morals, and by two hundred years of precedent. What the founders intended by their lan-
guage should be of relevance to us only as a heuristic device to enable us to think more clearly
about our own ideals. The dead hand of the past ought not to govern, for example, our treat-
ment of the liberty of free speech, and any theory of interpretation that demands that it does is a
bad theory.
Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 357 (1985); see Brennan,
supra note 60, at 438; Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1033 (1977).
310 See supra note 299; Simon, supra note 5, at 1499-1500.
311 See id. at 1501.
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nal constitution-makers. 312 Second, such restrictions may permit the
government to do things that seem as horrible to us as the enactors found
the things they prohibited. The imposition of the death penalty, for ex-
ample, has been suggested as something clearly outside the enactors'
view of cruel and unusual punishment but which, it is argued, we view
today as far crueler.313
A common response to this objection stresses the fundamental com-
mitment of our society to democracy.314 Any alternative to original in-
tentions adjudication that cures the problem of rigidity requires someone
to revise the constitutional rules in light of new conditions. Most objec-
tors locate that agency (subject to some specified non-textual constraints)
in judges who are unelected and largely unrepresentative. But original
intentions adjudication is not particularly incompatible with democratic
government either. The enactors' intent may have been popularly sanc-
tioned when first enacted, but over time their judgments are increasingly
unlikely to reflect contemporary majority opinion any better than the
choices of unelected, but living, judges. 315
It is true that many judgments inconsistent with the original inten-
tions have displaced decisions made by the politically accountable
branches. But such results are not an inevitable feature of adjudication
which is not constrained by the original intentions. Courts might ignore
original intent and formulate constitutional rules that leave legislative
and executive acts intact, while adherence to original intentions might
invalidate the very same acts. The Supreme Court's construction of the
privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment ii one such
an example, 316 and certain justiciability doctrines, especially the political
question doctrine, are others.3 17 Original intentions adjudication is
neither inherently restrained nor activist. 318
Thus, the recitation of the countermajoritarian problem is not an
adequate response to the objection of rigidity and antiquity. A better
response is to affirm the values inherent in "inflexibility"-the values of
stability and clarity. Constitutional government exists to limit the sphere
312 See Home Loan Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439-40, 442-44 (1934).
313 See Brest, supra note 6, at 220-21. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). The arguments about changing attitudes toward death are quite reasonable on
their face. I cannot help thinking, however, that from the viewpoint of the condemned person the
cruelty of the punishment must be about the same in either time period. Accord Weisberg, supra
note 146, at 990 & n.153.
314 See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 43, at 4-6; M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 9-10.
315 See Maltz, Appeal, supra note 11, at 4-5.
316 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 75-80 (1872); see R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 37-52; L.
TRIBE, supra note 127, at 418-21.
317 L. TRIBE, supra note 127, at 53-114; see also Maltz, Constitutional Originalism, supra note 11,
at 52-53.
318 Earl Maltz has put forward a somewhat different argument for the desirability of original
intentions adjudication based on the need for "neutrality" in judicial decision-making. See, Maltz,
supra note 11.
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of appropriate government activity.319 It rests on the premise that there
should be a realm of action and private decision-making immune from
public coercion. The value of dividing human activity into exclusively
private and potentially public zones would be severely diminished if the
boundary between the two areas could be frequently and unpredictably
altered. It is not merely the ability to contest, and sometimes success-
fully resist, government impositions that benefit those living under a con-
stitutional government. It is, at least as much, the ability to "count on"
government being constrained by certain procedures and within certain
limits. Such stability permits us confidently to plan our lives, a freedom
which is at the core of our capacity for self-definition. 320 The opposite
kind of existence, where we live in perpetual dread of the secret decree
and the surprise order becomes, at the extreme, totalitarianism-the op-
posite of government under law.321
This characteristic of government under law is not the only impor-
tant value in the relationship of government and the individual, but it is
difficult to overestimate its importance. In many circumstances stability
and assurance may be more important than the actual content of the
substantive rules applied. An example suggested by Hayek may make
this clearer.322 Imagine two conscription regimes. Under the first, you
may be called for military service for a period of one month to five years
at any time between age 20 and age 40. Under the second, you will defi-
nitely be in military service for a three year period between ages 22 and
25. The average expected service for any individual may be the same
319 It has been suggested that judicial review, limited to original intentions, increases the govern-
ment's overall ability to respond to changed circumstances because it frees the legislative and execu-
tive branches from the inhibiting restrictions created by the judiciary. See Maltz, New Thoughts,
supra note 11, at 825-26; Maltz, Appeal, supra note 11, at 18-19. Whether or not this is correct
depends on the particular rules the judges substitute for those originally intended. See supra text
accompanying notes 313-17. It might be argued that the very question of how much discretion
should be accorded the various branches is one that should be answered differently in different
situations.
320 See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 156-57 (1960); F. HAYEK, 1 LAw, LEGISLA-
TION AND LIBERTY; RULES AND ORDER 106-07 (1973); Harris, supra note 16, at 35; Simon, supra
note 306, at 604. It has been suggested that the introduction of original intentions adjudication, at
this time and in light of the accumulated precedents that are inconsistent with it, would aggravate
the problems of predictability and certainty. See Simon, supra note 5, at 1527. For reasons already
noted, see supra text accompanying note 14, I am not concerned here with these admittedly difficult
questions, but only with the relative stability of original intentions adjudication as an abstract mat-
ter. It has also been noted that, in light of the relative inaccessibility of legislative material to most
individuals, certainty and predictability would not really be served by adherence to original inten-
tions. See Moore, supra note 309, at 353-54. As I hope is clear by this time, my concern is a
comparative one. The rules issuing from original intentions adjudication will be more knowable and
more stable than those from any other plausible model of judicial review.
321 See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW 39-41 (1964). It is the capacity to know how
to avoid the impositions of government that separates the regime of law from the kind of pseudo
legal system depicted in F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1948).
322 See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTrrTUTION OF LIBERTY 143 (1960).
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under either system, but most people would probably be far more dis-
turbed by the first scheme than the second. The incapacity freely to plan
one's life, and the injury of never knowing when there may be a signifi-
cant interruption will outweigh whatever benefit the chance of a short
period of service might give us. When life-plans are at stake, we are
"risk-averse." Indeed, it may be the securing of a class of expectations
from undefined and unpredictable interferences that is the peculiar con-
tribution of law to society,323 a contribution particularly important when
it is applied to the potential dangers of abuse by government.324
The need for some minimum degree of stability can be seen by the
fact that nearly everyone agrees that some constitutional provisions re-
quire judges to follow the evident, and evidently intended, meaning. Ex-
pansive models of constitutional interpretation are rarely advanced with
respect to the minimum age of senators, the vote necessary to confirm a
treaty, or the days a bill may rest without a president's signature before it
becomes a law. 325 These rules, like any others, could become inappropri-
ate in changed circumstances; they could become obstacles to the
achievement of important benefits. But if these provisions were vulnera-
ble to judicial revision, the government would be precluded from under-
taking any long-term action because no official could act with the secure
expectation that his action would accomplish certain results.326 But no
easy line can be drawn between determinate structural or procedural
rules and open-ended substantive ones.327 And if some degree of cer-
tainty is essential to the regulation of the internal affairs of government,
it is hard to see why it is less essential to the regulation of government
interference in the internal affairs of individual lives.328
But recognition of this value does not rebut the initial objection to
original intentions adjudication that static constitutional rules are unsuit-
able for a constantly changing society. It is merely a counter-weight.
Whether it is sufficient depends on an evaluation of the relative impor-
tance of the competing values: the value of flexibility and adaptability on
323 See id. at 156-59, 208-09.
324 Thus the common law maxim that an uncertain jurisprudence is the most wretched servitude.
See Adams, A Defence of the Constitution of Government of the United States ofAmerica, in WoRKs
OF JOhN ADAMS 583-84 (C. Adams ed. 1851) quoted in Chadha v. I.N.S., 634 F.2d 408, 424 n.19
(D.C. Cir. 1980), affid, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
325 See supra text accompanying notes 164-67; Carter, supra note 54, at 853-59; Levinson, supra
note 50, at 382 n.33; Maltz, New Thoughts, supra note 11, at 833; Perry supra note 15, at 570-71. Of
course some commentators deny there are any provisions which ought to be regarded as having only
one plausible interpretation. See supra note 164; Easterbrook, supra note 106, at 90-91; Peller, supra
note 50, at 1174; Simon, supra note 306, at 621.
326 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 368; Brest, supra note 6, at 229; Carter, supra note 54, at
856-57.
327 See Schauer, supra note 69, at 430.
328 But see R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 368-69 (As "matters of principle," the meaning of
individual rights "cannot be seen as stopping where some historical statesman's time, imagination
and interest stopped.").
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the one hand, and the value of predictability and stability on the other. 329
Moreover, in specific cases, these concerns cannot be considered in
isolation. How we view their competing advantages will be influenced by
the substantive content of the constitutional rules at issue, and our regard
for the individuals who, as judges, will undertake whatever revisions are
allowed.330 Our enthusiasm for stable rules will be reduced if we think
the rules protected are oppressive and unfair. Our taste for responsive
and up-to-date rules will be diminished if we know they will be "im-
proved" by people we regard as ignorant or immoral. Thus the precon-
stitutional decision must be largely empirical, depending on facts that
may be disputed and it must, therefore, be only provisional.33 1
Even if we could agree about the quality of the substantive rules and
the credentials of the judges who would supervise their evolution, we
would probably still disagree on the desirability of adhering to the origi-
nal intentions because the weights we assign these competing sets of val-
ues are different. Those preferences, in turn, would depend on our
confidence in the capacity of government officials, including judges, to
discover and act on the public good without well-defined prior rules and
on the risk that, without strict prior limits, such officials might cause
suffering, unrest, and injury.332 Our choice of the governing norm of
constitutional adjudication, then, will turn on the kinds of chances we
are willing to take in living together in society, and, what comes to the
same thing, on our judgment as to the kind of people we are.
329 Cooley posited the same opposition almost one hundred years ago. See Cooley, Comparative
Merits of Written and Prescriptive Constitutions, 2 HARV. L. REV. 341, 346-47, 349 (1889); see also
Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431 (1985). Some writers have explicitly
questioned whether the values of clarity and predictability are important enough to justify original
intentions adjudication. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 141-42; Simon, supra note 5, at 1529.
Cf. Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599-600 (considering trade-off between predictability
and optimal results in individual cases). Another commentator has questioned whether the distinc-
tion between certain rules and flexible standards can be maintained, see Schlag, Rules and Standards,
33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985). And yet another has found the Constitution's greatness in its sprawl-
ing and even contradictory nature. See TRIBE, The Idea of the Constitution: A Metaphor-Morphosis
37 J. LEG. ED. 170, 173 (1987).
330 See M. PERRY supra note 5, at 143; Perry supra note 15, at 582.
331 See Alexander, supra note 130, at 463. I have ignored here the question how this decision is
made and who makes it. It is, I suspect, a tacit social decision, one to which officials, scholars, and
the temper of the times all contribute. It follows obviously from what I have argued that no person
or group of persons has any "authority" to make this decision, certainly not the judges themselves.
332 See Kay, supra note 30, at 195-202.
